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作者：Hedlund, Jonas
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
摘要：This paper studies strategic transmission of verifiable information with reporting costs that continuously increase in the precision of the report. Contrary to previous literature, it is shown that the unraveling result first derived by Milgrom (1981) is relatively robust to costly reporting. A separating equilibrium exists even with arbitrarily high reporting costs. Intuitively, the costs work as a signaling device and a combination of disclosure of information and costly signaling accomplish...
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作者：Morrill, Thayer
作者单位：North Carolina State University
摘要：It is impossible for a mechanism to be strategyproof, Pareto efficient, and eliminate justified envy. However, little is known to what extent a strategyproof and efficient mechanism can limit justified envy. We define an assignment to be unjust if a student i is not assigned to a school a that she prefers to her own assignment, i has higher priority at a than some student j who is assigned to a, and none of the students ranked higher at a than i are dependent on j. We prove that Top Trading Cy...
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作者：Tan, Jonathan H. W.; Breitmoser, Yves; Bolle, Friedel
作者单位：University of Nottingham; Humboldt University of Berlin; European University Viadrina Frankfurt Oder
摘要：We study games where voluntary contributions can be adjusted until a steady state is reached. In consent games contributions start low and can be increased; in dissent games contributions start high and can be decreased. The equilibrium prediction is free riding in consent games but as much as social efficiency in dissent games. We test it experimentally and confirm that the dissent mechanism yields substantial welfare improvements over the consent mechanism. With experience, subjects contribu...
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作者：Murto, Pauli; Valimaki, Juuso
作者单位：Aalto University
摘要：We analyze large symmetric auctions with conditionally i.i.d. common values and risk averse bidders. Our main result characterizes the asymptotic equilibrium price distribution for the first- and second-price auctions. As an implication, we show that with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), the second-price auction raises significantly more revenue than the first-price auction. While this ranking seems robust in numerical analysis also outside the CARA specification, we show by counterexam...
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作者：Chen, Yan; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs; Morgan, Peter
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Tsinghua University; University of Zurich; University of Konstanz; State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Buffalo, SUNY
摘要：Social segregation is a ubiquitous feature of human life. People segregate along the lines of income, religion, ethnicity, language, and other characteristics. This study provides the first experimental examination of decentralized matching with search frictions and institutionalized segregation. The findings indicate that, without a segregation institution, high types over-segregate relative to the equilibrium prediction. We observe segregation attempts even when equilibrium suggests that eve...
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作者：Hoffmann, Eric J.; Sabarwal, Tarun
作者单位：University of Kansas
摘要：In Karp et al. (2007), an argument is made to show existence of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in global games that may include both strategic substitutes and complements. This note documents a gap in the proof of that statement. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Bogomolnaia, Anna; Moulin, Herve
作者单位：University of Glasgow
摘要：When not all objects are acceptable to all agents, maximizing the number of objects actually assigned is an important design concern. We compute the guaranteed size ratio of the Probabilistic Serial mechanism, i.e., the worst ratio of the actual expected size to the maximal feasible size. It converges decreasingly to 1 - 1/e similar or equal to 63.2% as the maximal size increases. It is the best ratio of any Envy-Free assignment mechanism. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W.
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of Cologne; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：In the basic adverse selection model, a seller makes a contract offer to a privately informed buyer. A fundamental hypothesis of incentive theory is that the seller may want to offer a menu of contracts to separate the buyer types. In the good state of nature, total surplus is not different from the symmetric information benchmark, while in the bad state, private information may be welfare-reducing. We have conducted a laboratory experiment with 954 participants to test these hypotheses. While...
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作者：Board, Simon
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
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作者：Diamantoudi, Effrosyni; Miyagawa, Eiichi; Xue, Licun
作者单位：Concordia University - Canada; Kobe University; McGill University
摘要：The two-sided matching literature has focused on static and centralized games. However, in many markets, the matching is determined in decentralized fashion and continues to change. This paper considers infinitely-repeated matching games, where firms whose positions become vacant make offers to workers, who then decide which offers to accept and the game continues. We study how the stationary-equilibrium outcome depends on whether players commit to their employment relationships. We show that,...
