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作者：Ruiz, Adrian de Groot; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander
作者单位：Radboud University Nijmegen; University of Amsterdam
摘要：In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria in cheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussion of how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talk games. In this paper, we propose a new refinement and stability measure that is intended to predict actual behavior in a wide range of cheap talk games. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), the stability of an equilibrium is determined by the frequency and s...
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作者：Ortner, Juan
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：I consider a standard implementation problem under complete information when agents have a minimal degree of honesty. In particular, I assume that agents are white lie averse: they strictly prefer to tell the truth whenever lying has no effect on their material payoff. I show that if there are at least five agents who are all white lie averse and if I impose either of two refinements of Nash equilibrium, then a simple direct mechanism fully implements any social choice function. (C) 2015 Elsev...
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作者：Eliaz, Kfir; Spiegler, Ran
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of London; University College London
摘要：What is common to the following situations: designing random incentive schemes to implement team effort, monopoly pricing when consumers are loss averse, arms races when players are privately informed of their armament costs? We present a simple formalism, called X-games, which captures these situations as well as others, and use it to unify and extend the separate analyses that they received in the literature. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Hartline, Jason D.; Keinberg, Robert; Malekian, Azarakhsh
作者单位：Northwestern University; Cornell University; University of Toronto
摘要：Optimally allocating cellphone spectrum, advertisements on the Internet, and landing slots at airports is computationally intractable. When the participants may strategize, not only must the optimizer deal with complex feasibility constraints but also with complex incentive constraints. We give a very simple method for constructing a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism from any, potentially non-optimal, algorithm that maps agents' reports to an allocation. The expected welfare of the mecha...
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作者：Barbera, Salvador; Bevia, Carmen; Ponsati, Clara
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; University of St Andrews
摘要：Egalitarianism and meritocracy are competing principles to distribute the joint benefits of cooperation. We examine the consequences of letting members of society vote between those two principles, in a context where individuals must join with others into coalitions of a certain size to become productive. Our setup induces a hedonic game of coalition formation. We study the existence of core stable partitions (organizational structures) of this game. We show that the inability of voters to com...
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作者：Balbus, Lukasz; Jaskiewicz, Anna; Nowak, Andrzej S.
作者单位：University of Zielona Gora; Wroclaw University of Science & Technology
摘要：In this paper, we prove the existence of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium for a stochastic version of the bequest game. A novel feature in our approach is the fact that the transition probability need not be non-atomic and therefore, the deterministic production function is not excluded from consideration. Moreover, in addition to the common expected utility we also deal with a utility that takes into account an attitude of the generation towards risk. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights ...
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作者：Ghosh, Saptarshi P.; Roy, Jaideep
作者单位：Shiv Nadar University; Murdoch University
摘要：We analyze the quality (informativeness and efficiency) of advice obtained from a committee of careerist experts where voting is secret but voting profiles are 'leaked' with an exogenously given probability. We show that fully informative voting is achievable only when the common prior is not too informative, the committee uses the unanimity rule and faces random leakage. It is then shown that informativeness and efficiency are mutually exclusive properties of committees with careerist experts...
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作者：Gentry, Matthew; Li, Tong; Lu, Jingfeng
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Vanderbilt University; National University of Singapore
摘要：In this paper, we study the existence of monotone equilibrium in first price auctions where bidders have a three-dimensional private type, i.e. their private values, degrees of risk aversion and initial wealth. Bidders' utility functions belong to the class of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) or constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). The bidders' types are independent across bidders, while a bidder's private value, initial wealth and degree of risk aversion are allowed to be correlated....
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作者：Karos, Dominik; Peters, Hans
作者单位：University of Oxford; Maastricht University
摘要：In a mutual control structure (mcs) agents exercise control over each other. Typical examples occur in the area of corporate governance: firms and investment companies exercise mutual control, in particular by owning each others' stocks. We represent such situations in two equivalent ways: by a function assigning to each coalition the set of controlled players, and by a simple game structure in which for each player a simple game describes who controls that player. These concepts are similar t...
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作者：Corgnet, Brice; Hernan-Gonzalez, Roberto; Rassenti, Stephen
作者单位：Chapman University System; Chapman University; Chapman University System; Chapman University; University of Granada; University of Nottingham
摘要：We study the effect of firing threats in a virtual workplace that reproduces features of existing organizations. We show that organizations in which bosses can fire up to one third of their workforce produce twice as much as organizations for which firing is not possible. Firing threats sharply decrease on-the-job leisure. Nevertheless, organizations endowed with firing threats underperformed those using individual incentives. In the presence of firing threats, employees engage in impression m...
