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作者：Cingiz, Kutay; Flesch, Janos; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Predtetchinski, Arkadi
作者单位：Maastricht University; Maastricht University
摘要：We study centipede games played by an infinite sequence of players. Following the literature on time-inconsistent preferences, we distinguish two types of decision makers, naive and sophisticated, and the corresponding solution concepts, naive epsilon-equilibrium and sophisticated epsilon-equilibrium. We show the existence of both naive and sophisticated epsilon-equilibria for each positive epsilon. Under the assumption that the payoff functions are upper semicontinuous, we furthermore show th...
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作者：Li, Jian; Zhou, Junjie
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; McGill University; McGill University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：Blackwell (1951, 1953) proposes an informativeness ranking of experiments: experiment I is more Blackwell-informative than experiment II if and only if the value of experiment I is higher than that of experiment II for all expected-utility maximizers. Under commitment and reduction, our main theorem shows that Blackwell equivalence holds for all convex and strongly monotone preferences-i.e., uncertainty-averse preferences (Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2011b), which nest most ambiguity-averse prefer...
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作者：Morelli, Massimo; Park, In-Uck
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University; University of Bristol; Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU)
摘要：In deciding whether to join a coalition or not, an agent must consider both i) the expected power of the coalition and ii) her position in the vertical structure within the coalition. We establish the existence of a positive relationship between the degree of inequality in remuneration within coalitions and the number of coalitions to be formed endogenously in stable systems. We show that such coalitions can be mixed and balanced, rather than segregated, in terms of members' ability levels. In...
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作者：Weinschenk, Philipp
作者单位：University of Mannheim; University of Kaiserslautern; Max Planck Society
摘要：We study a dynamic model of team production with moral hazard. We show that players might procrastinate to exploit the future externalities of team production. Contract design is shown to be a powerful tool to mitigate the problem of procrastination and enhance efficiency. The team's ability to write discriminatory contracts is therefore central. We also show that deadlines are not beneficial for a team, provided that players can choose efforts frequently and design contracts optimally. (C) 20...
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作者：Virag, Gabor
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：We study auctions with resale and reserve prices. We characterize the equilibrium, and compare the revenues of the first price auction with that of the second price auction. We show that several results change when a reserve price is introduced. First, the second-price auction may yield higher revenues than the first-price auction. Second, the strong bidder is more likely to win than the weak bidder. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Bajoori, Elnaz; Flesch, Janos; Vermeulen, Dries
作者单位：University of Bath; Maastricht University
摘要：We develop the notion of perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium-perfect BNE-in general Bayesian games. We test perfect BNE against the criteria laid out by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). We show that, for a focal class of Bayesian games, perfect BNE exists. Moreover, when payoffs are continuous, perfect BNE is limit undominated for almost every type. We illustrate the use of perfect BNE in the context of a second-price auction with interdependent values. Perfect BNE selects the unique pure strategy e...
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作者：Barbieri, Stefano; Malueg, David A.
作者单位：Tulane University; University of California System; University of California Riverside
摘要：We model competing groups when players' values for winning are private information, each group's performance equals the best effort (best shot) of its members, and the group with the best performance wins the contest. At the symmetric equilibrium of symmetric contests, increasing the number of competing teams may increase or decrease each team's performance, but it unambiguously increases the overall expected best shot. Depending on the elasticity of the distribution of players' values, indivi...
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作者：Haeringer, Guillaume; Halaburda, Hanna
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); Bank of Canada; New York University
摘要：We propose a way to compare the extent of preference misrepresentation between two strategies. We define a preference revelation mechanism to be monotone strategyproof if declaring a more truthful preference ordering dominates (with respect to the true preferences) declaring a less truthful preference ordering. Our main result states that a mechanism is strategyproof if, and only if, it is monotone strategyproof. This result holds for any deterministic social choice function on any domain; for...
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作者：Kraekel, Matthias
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：In a multi-agent setting, individuals often compare own performance with that of their peers. These comparisons influence agents' incentives and lead to a noncooperative game, even if the agents have to complete independent tasks. I show that depending on the interplay of the peer effects, agents' efforts are either strategic complements or strategic substitutes, but the Informativeness Principle always applies. I solve for the optimal monetary incentives that complement the peer effects. In c...
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作者：Tan, Xu
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：We explore the incentives to reveal verifiable private information when there are both common and private components to agents' valuations and when private information is held in both dimensions. When agents observe only one signal, they have no incentive to reveal the signal because such a revelation would negate their information advantage. However, when agents observe multiple signals, they may be incentivized to reveal certain signals that could lower their opponents' bids and thereby resu...
