Information revelation in auctions with common and private values

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tan, Xu
• 署名单位: University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.006
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 147-165
• 关键词: Information revelation; auctions; Two-dimensional values; EFFICIENCY

摘要

We explore the incentives to reveal verifiable private information when there are both common and private components to agents' valuations and when private information is held in both dimensions. When agents observe only one signal, they have no incentive to reveal the signal because such a revelation would negate their information advantage. However, when agents observe multiple signals, they may be incentivized to reveal certain signals that could lower their opponents' bids and thereby result in a higher profit from other signals. This paper shows that there exists an equilibrium with revelation of common-value signals in standard auctions, which is an efficient equilibrium that maximizes the social welfare and could provide the seller with a higher profit than a situation with no information revelation. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.