Doing it now, later, or never

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cingiz, Kutay; Flesch, Janos; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Predtetchinski, Arkadi
• 署名单位: Maastricht University; Maastricht University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.007
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 174-185
• 关键词: Centipede games; Subgame perfect 6-equilibria; Time-inconsistent preferences; Upper semi-continuous functions; Sophisticated players; Naive players

摘要

We study centipede games played by an infinite sequence of players. Following the literature on time-inconsistent preferences, we distinguish two types of decision makers, naive and sophisticated, and the corresponding solution concepts, naive epsilon-equilibrium and sophisticated epsilon-equilibrium. We show the existence of both naive and sophisticated epsilon-equilibria for each positive epsilon. Under the assumption that the payoff functions are upper semicontinuous, we furthermore show that there exist both naive and sophisticated 0-equilibria in pure strategies. We also compare the probability to stop of a naive versus a sophisticated decision maker and show that a sophisticated decision maker stops earlier. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.