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作者：Li, Yunan
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper studies the revenue maximization problem in environments wherein buyers have interdependent values and correlated types. We show that (1) when the system of feasible sets is a matroid and buyer valuations satisfy a single-crossing condition, the generalized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms with lazy reserves (VCG-L) are ex-post incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational; (2) if, in addition, the valuation distribution satisfies a generalized monotone hazard rate conditio...
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作者：Akerlof, Robert
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：People's values are a critical determinant of their behavior. But, how do values form and what causes them to change? This paper proposes a theory of value formation. In the model, agents choose values, motivated by economic considerations and, crucially, also by the desire for esteem. The comparative statics are driven by the following tension: agents obtain more esteem from peers if they conform in their choice of values; but they may obtain more self-esteem if they differentiate. This tensi...
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作者：Wellman, Michael P.; Sodomka, Eric; Greenwald, Amy
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Facebook Inc; Brown University
摘要：Bidding in simultaneous auctions is challenging because an agent's value for a good in one auction may depend on the outcome of other auctions; that is, bidders face an exposure problem. Previous works have tackled the exposure problem with heuristic strategies that employ probabilistic price predictions so-called price-prediction strategies. We introduce a concept of self-confirming prices, and show that within an independent private value model, Bayes-Nash equilibrium can be fully characteri...
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作者：Echenique, Federico; Galichon, Alfred
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; New York University; New York University; Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po)
摘要：We characterize solutions for two-sided matching, both in the transferable- and in the nontransferable-utility frameworks, using a cardinal formulation. Our approach makes the comparison of the matching models with and without transfers particularly transparent. We introduce the concept of a no-trade stable matching to study the role of transfers in matching. A no-trade stable matching is one in which the availability of transfers does not affect the outcome. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights ...
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作者：Lien, Jaimie W.; Zheng, Jie; Zhong, Xiaohan
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; Tsinghua University
摘要：In a school choice mechanism, school priorities are often based on student exam scores, by which student true ability may not be perfectly revealed. An ex-post fair matching mechanism (for example, Serial Dictatorship) can be undesirable in that it is not exante fair: it may not match students with higher abilities to better schools, although it always matches students with higher scores to better schools. In this paper we consider a potential way of improving ex-ante fairness a Boston mechani...
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作者：Allouch, Nizar
作者单位：University of Kent
摘要：This paper investigates the welfare effect of income redistribution in the private provision of public goods on networks. We first show that the welfare effect of income redistribution is determined by Bonacich centrality. Then we develop an index based on the network structure of interactions, which, roughly speaking, measures the welfare effect of income redistribution confined to a component of contributors. The proposed index vanishes when applied to large components of contributors that d...
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作者：Dietzenbacher, Bas; Borm, Peter; Hendrickx, Ruud
作者单位：Tilburg University; Tilburg University
摘要：In this paper we introduce and analyze the procedural egalitarian solution for transferable utility games. This new concept is based on the result of a coalitional bargaining procedure in which egalitarian considerations play a central role. The procedural egalitarian solution is the first single-valued solution which coincides with the constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) on the class of convex games and which exists for any TU-game. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reser...
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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen
作者单位：Yale University; Princeton University
摘要：We propose an incomplete information version of rationalizability. An action is said to be belief-free rationalizable if it survives the following iterated deletion process. At each stage, we delete actions for a type of a player that are not a best response to some conjectures of the player. The conjecture has to put positive weight only on states, and types and actions of the other players which that type thinks possible, and actions of those types that have survived so far. We analyze some ...
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作者：Maas, Alexander; Goemans, Christopher; Manning, Dale; Kroll, Stephan; Brown, Thomas
作者单位：University of Idaho; Colorado State University System; Colorado State University Fort Collins; United States Department of Agriculture (USDA); United States Forest Service
摘要：Many common pool resources (CPRs) have tipping points stock levels below which the resource is permanently damaged or destroyed but the specific levels at which these thresholds are crossed are rarely known with certainty. We model a CPR in which uncertainty simultaneously creates a Prisoner's Dilemma and a Coordination Game. This model highlights a novel mechanism through which uncertainty incentivizes the overuse of a CPR. In the model, two Nash Equilibria exist, both of which lead to a Trag...
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作者：Anesi, Vincent; Duggan, John
作者单位：University of Nottingham; University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：This note examines the structure of stationary bargaining equilibria in the finite framework of Anesi (2010). The main result establishes a tight connection between the set of equilibrium absorbing points and the von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions: assuming that players are patient, that the voting rule is oligarchical, and that there is at least one veto player with positive recognition probability, a set of alternatives corresponds to the absorbing points of an equilibrium if and only if it i...
