Auctions with resale: Reserve prices and revenues

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Virag, Gabor
• 署名单位: University of Toronto
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.009
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 239-249
• 关键词: Auctions; resale

摘要

We study auctions with resale and reserve prices. We characterize the equilibrium, and compare the revenues of the first price auction with that of the second price auction. We show that several results change when a reserve price is introduced. First, the second-price auction may yield higher revenues than the first-price auction. Second, the strong bidder is more likely to win than the weak bidder. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.