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作者：Bedard, Nicholas C.
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：The value of the principal's information is studied in a common value principal-agent model. We prove in a general environment that there is a nontrivial set of parameters for which the principal strictly prefers not to be fully informed, regardless of the equilibrium played. Importantly, we do not restrict the principal's offer-space, thereby allowing her to make full strategic use of any information she has. We also show that, among partitional information structures and given certain priors...
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作者：Bhattacharya, Sourav; Duffy, John; Kim, SunTak
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; University of California System; University of California Irvine; National Taiwan University
摘要：The Condorcet jury model with costless but informative signals about the true state of the world predicts that the efficiency of group decision-making increases unambiguously with the group size. However, if signal acquisition is made an endogenous and costly decision, then rational voters have disincentives to purchase information as the group size becomes larger. We investigate the extent to which human subjects recognize this trade-off between better information aggregation and greater ince...
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作者：Kim, Jin Yeub
作者单位：University of Nebraska System; University of Nebraska Lincoln
摘要：Third-party intervention can reduce the risk of conflict in situations where the bargaining failure is due to asymmetric information. In this paper, I consider the selection of a third party in a two-person bargaining problem where each disputant has private information about its relative strength or weakness. For a class of problems, I find that the disputants choose the third party that is best for the strong type but worst for the weak type due to the incentive of each disputant to avoid se...
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作者：Shin, Euncheol
作者单位：Kyung Hee University
摘要：I present a model of dynamic pricing and diffusion of a network good sold by a monopolist. In the model, the network good is a subscription social network good. This means that in each period, each consumer has to pay a subscription price to use the good, and the utility derived from subscribing to the good increases as more of her neighboring consumers subscribe. Consumers myopically optimize their subscription decisions, and the monopolist chooses a sequence of subscription prices that maxim...
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作者：Stauber, Ronald
作者单位：Australian National University
摘要：Based on a model where deviations from equilibrium play are assumed to identify irrational players who are characterized by ambiguous set-valued strategies, this paper introduces an equilibrium notion for extensive games with ambiguity averse players that yields a precise interpretation for the counterfactual reasoning usually associated with backward induction. The resulting equilibria are always Nash equilibria, but may not satisfy the conditions required for various refinements of Nash equi...
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作者：Barbera, Salvador; Coelho, Danilo
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada (IPEA)
摘要：Rules of k names are two-stage procedures where a first set of agents, the proposers, select k individuals from a set of candidates, and then another agent, the chooser, appoints one among those k in the list. The list of k names is often arrived at by letting each of the proposers vote for v candidates and then choosing those k with the highest support. We then speak of v-rules of k names. We study how different choices of the parameters v and k affect the balance of power between the propose...
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作者：Goeree, Jacob K.; Zhang, Jingjing
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney; University of Cologne; University of Technology Sydney
摘要：We compare two mechanisms to implement a simple binary choice, e.g. adopt one of two proposals. We show that when neither alternative is ex ante preferred, simple majority voting cannot implement the first best outcome. We introduce a simple bidding mechanism where votes can be bought at a quadratic cost and voters receive rebates equal to the average of others' payments. This mechanism is budget-balanced, individually rational, and fully efficient in the limit. Moreover, the mechanism redistr...
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作者：Chatterjee, Kalyan; Das, Kaustav
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Exeter
摘要：We study a model of decentralised bilateral interactions in a small market where one of the sellers has private information about her value. In addition to this seller with private information, there are two identical buyers and another seller, whose valuation is commonly known to be in between the two possible valuations of the seller with private information. We consider an infinite horizon game with simultaneous one-sided offers and simultaneous responses. We construct one particular PBE of...
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作者：Garrett, Daniel F.
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We study the optimal mechanism in a dynamic sales relationship where the buyer's arrival date is uncertain, and where his value changes stochastically over time. The buyer's arrival date is the first date at which contracting is feasible and is his private information. To induce immediate participation, the buyer is granted positive expected rents even if his value at arrival is the lowest possible. The buyer is punished for arriving late; i.e., he expects to earn less of the surplus. Optimal ...
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作者：Deckelbaum, Alan; Micali, Silvio
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Green and Laffont proved that no collusion-resilient dominant-strategy mechanism, whose strategies consist of individual valuations, guarantees efficiency in multi-unit auctions. Chen and Micali bypassed this impossibility by slightly enlarging the strategy spaces, yet assuming knowledge of the maximum value a player may have for a copy of the good, and the ability of imposing high fines on the players. For unrestricted combinatorial auctions, efficiency in collusion-resilient dominant strateg...
