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作者：Grosser, Jens; Seebauer, Michael
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University; State University System of Florida; Florida State University; University of Erlangen Nuremberg
摘要：We study majority voting over two alternatives in small groups. Individuals have identical preferences but are uncertain about which alternative can better achieve their common interest. Before voting, each individual can obtain information by buying a valuable but imperfect signal about the better alternative. Voting is either voluntary or compulsory. In the compulsory mode, each individual must vote between the two alternatives, while in the voluntary mode they can also abstain. An uninforme...
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作者：Terstiege, Stefan
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：I study information gathering for rent-seeking purposes in contracting. In my model, an agent learns his payoff type only after accepting a contract, but can at costs acquire imperfect information while deliberating whether to accept. I show that the principal deters the acquisition if and only if the costs are high. The result stands in contrast to a finding by Cremer and Khalil (1992), who demonstrate that the acquisition of perfect information will always be deterred. A key insight is that ...
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作者：Brown, Alexander L.; Velez, Rodrigo A.
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：In experimental partnership dissolution problems with complete information, the divide and-choose mechanism is significantly superior to the winner's-bid auction. The performance of divide-and-choose is mainly affected by reciprocity issues and not by bounded rationality. The performance of the winner's-bid auction is significantly affected by bounded rationality. Contrary to theoretical predictions divide-and-choose exhibits no first mover bias. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Harless, Patrick
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：Working in the Arrowian framework, we search for preference aggregation rules with desirable solidarity properties. In a fixed-population setting, we formulate two versions of the solidarity axiom welfare dominance under preference replacement. Although the stronger proves incompatible with efficiency, the combination of efficiency and our second version leads to an important class of rules which improve upon a status quo order. These rules are also strategy-proof, which reveals a further conn...
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作者：Shao, Ran; Zhou, Lin
作者单位：Yeshiva University; Shanghai Jiao Tong University
摘要：In this paper, we consider the problem of allocating an indivisible good efficiently between two agents with monetary transfers. We focus on allocation mechanisms that are dominant-strategy incentive compatible when agents' types are private information. Inefficiency of an allocation mechanism may come from two sources: misallocation of the indivisible good and an imbalanced budget. Unfortunately, as Green and Laffont (1979) demonstrate, no allocation mechanism can always overcome both kinds o...
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作者：Hatfield, John William; Plott, Charles R.; Tanaka, Tomomi
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; California Institute of Technology; The World Bank
摘要：We investigate how price ceilings and floors affect outcomes in continuous time, double auction markets with discrete goods and multiple qualities. When price controls exist, the existence of competitive equilibria is no longer guaranteed; hence, we investigate the nature of non-price competition and how markets might evolve in its presence. We develop a quality competition model based on matching theory. Equilibria of the quality competition model always exist in such price-constrained market...
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作者：Troya-Martinez, Marta
作者单位：New Economic School
摘要：This paper considers a model in which two heterogeneous principals need to concur to approve a project proposed by an agent. The agent provides them with information about the project's desirability and the principals can agree to share it. We seek to understand the impact of such an agreement when the agent can secretly choose the vagueness of the information reported to the principals. We show that when the project is controversial and the principals retain their veto power, information-shar...
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作者：Kloosterman, Andrew; Schotter, Andrew
摘要：This paper considers the problem of why societies develop differently, a question most recently articulated by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). We follow North (1990) in defining institutions as the rules of the game in society. The question then becomes why do some societies develop functional institutions while others do not? To investigate this question, we develop and examine a specific type of dynamic game (which we call an Institutional Game). Our point is that complementarities among the c...
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作者：Kneeland, Terri
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：This paper provides the first unified explanation of behavior in coordinated attack games under both public and private information. It demonstrates that the main experimental results, such as threshold strategies, comparative statics, and the differences in behavior under public and private information, are robust predictions of limited depth of reasoning models. This is in contrast to equilibrium, which mispredicts the coordinating roles of public and private information. The analysis has im...
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作者：Roger, Guillaume
作者单位：University of Sydney
摘要：Two principals engage in Hotelling competition for an agent's services under incomplete information as to her outside option (location). This renders the agent's participation decision probabilistic from the perspective of each principal. Regardless of the market structure at equilibrium the optimal contract features a trade-off between participation probability and incentives. Rent and effort are inversely related and non-monotonic in the agent's transport cost and so in market structures; th...
