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作者：Goeree, Jacob K.; Kushnir, Alexey
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney; University of Cologne; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：We provide a unified and simple treatment of reduced-form implementation for general social choice problems and extend it to environments with value interdependencies. We employ the geometric approach developed by Goeree and Kushnir (2016) to characterize the set of feasible interim agent values (agent utilities excluding transfers) by deriving the analytical expression of its support function. As an application, we use the reduced form implementation to analyze second-best mechanisms in envir...
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作者：Noldeke, Georg; Pena, Jorge
作者单位：University of Basel; Max Planck Society
摘要：We characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria of the symmetric voter participation game with complete information from Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983). To do so, we use methods based on polynomials in Bernstein form to determine how the probability that a voter is pivotal depends on the participation probability and the number of players in the game. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Li, Zhuozheng; Rantakari, Heikki; Yang, Huanxing
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University of Rochester
摘要：We study a competitive cheap talk model with two senders. Each sender is responsible for a single project and observes its return. Exactly one project will be implemented. Both senders share some common interests with the principal, but have own-project biases. Under simultaneous communication, all equilibria are shown to be partition equilibria, but all the equilibria can no longer be ranked ex ante in terms of Pareto efficiency. The payoff of the principal depends on both the total conflict ...
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作者：Ertac, Seda; Kockesen, Levent; Ozdemir, Duygu
作者单位：Koc University; University of Essex
摘要：We theoretically and experimentally analyze the role of verifiability and privacy in strategic performance feedback using a one principal-two agent context with real effort. We confirm the theoretical prediction that information transmission occurs only in verifiable feedback mechanisms and private-verifiable feedback is the most informative mechanism. Yet, subjects also exhibit some behavior that cannot be explained by our baseline model, such as telling the truth even when this will definite...
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作者：Matros, Alexander; Smirnov, Vladimir
作者单位：University of South Carolina System; University of South Carolina Columbia; Lancaster University; University of Sydney
摘要：In this paper we examine the dynamic search of two rivals looking for a prize of known value that is hidden in an unknown location, modeled as search for treasure on an island. In every period, the players choose how much to search of the previously unsearched portion of the island in a winner-takes-all contest. If the players cannot coordinate so as to avoid searching the same locations, the unique equilibrium involves complete dissipation of rents. On the other hand, if the players have some...
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作者：Qiao, Lei; Yu, Haomiao; Zhang, Zhixiang
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Toronto Metropolitan University; Central University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We show that if every large game with a given player space and any given uncountable trait space (or action set) is a proper idealized limit, then the player space must be saturated. When the player space is allowed to be an arbitrary atomless probability space, even a non-saturated one such as the classical Lebesgue unit interval, we establish the following: (i) If a large game has a countable action set and a countable trait space, then the game has a closed Nash equilibrium correspondence, ...
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作者：Zhou, Junjie
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：This paper explores leadership within hierarchical organizations. For each hierarchy, I consider a dynamic signaling game in which each player observes only the actions of his direct superiors before choosing his action. At the top of the hierarchy are the leaders, who learn the state from nature. The hierarchy controls the flow of information and the timing of the game, and determines the equilibrium output and welfare. I show that the welfare-optimal hierarchy is the chain, because it maximi...
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作者：Brusco, Sandro; Roy, Jaideep
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Deakin University
摘要：We study a dynamic model of elections where many parties may enter or exit political competition. At each election a new political leadership arrives for each party. The leadership cannot choose the party's platform (ideological identities are fixed) but must decide whether or not to contest the election. Contesting elections is costly and this cost is higher if the party has recently been inactive. The distribution of voters' ideal policies, or public opinion, changes over time via a Markov p...
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作者：Cheung, Man-Wah
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：This paper studies imitative dynamics for games with continuous strategy space. We define imitative dynamics which include the replicator dynamic as a special case as evolutionary dynamics that satisfy the imitative property and payoff monotonicity. Our definition of payoff monotonicity, which we use Radon-Nikodym derivatives to define, is weaker than the one proposed in Oechssler and Riedel (2002). We find that Oechssler and Riedel (2002)'s definition is too strong, and our definition is more...
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作者：Lee, Byung Soo; Stewart, Colin
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：In one-shot games, an analyst who knows the best response correspondence can only make limited inferences about the players' payoffs. In repeated games with full monitoring, this is not true: we show that, under a weak condition, if the game is repeated sufficiently many times and players are sufficiently patient, the best response correspondence completely determines the payoffs (up to positive affine transformations). (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
