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作者：Frug, Alexander
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：A discrete version of Crawford and Sobel's (1982) cheap talk model is considered. Unlike in the continuous case, limiting attention to partitional equilibria is with loss of generality. The need to consider equilibria that are non-partitional complicates the analysis. It is shown that if utility functions are concave and the sender is upwardly biased, then the receiver's optimal equilibrium is necessarily partitional. Based on this result, a simple characterization of the optimal equilibrium f...
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作者：Name-Correa, Alvaro J.; Yildirim, Huseyin
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Duke University
摘要：We develop a theory of charitable giving in which donors feel social pressure from a direct solicitation. We show that equilibrium donations are concentrated around a social norm. Despite a higher level of the public good, relatively poor and/or low altruism givers fare worse under social pressure and would avoid the solicitor at a cost. Aggregate donor welfare improves to the extent that the added social motive alleviates the underprovision of the public good; however, overprovision may resul...
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作者：Cho, Wonki Jo
作者单位：Sogang University
摘要：We study three incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms: (i) strategy-proofness, which requires that no agent gain by misrepresenting his preferences; (ii) adjacent strategy-proofness, which requires that no agent gain by switching the rankings of two adjacent alternatives; and (iii) mistake monotonicity, which requires that the welfare of each agent weakly decrease as he reports increasingly bigger mistakes. Each of these properties has three versions, depending on whether preferences over...
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作者：Bolton, Gary E.; Karagozoglu, Emin
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Ihsan Dogramaci Bilkent University
摘要：What makes a bargaining proposal credible? We study how hard leverage (binding commitment) influences soft leverage (appealing to a focal point) in a rich-context bargaining game known to exhibit competing claims to focality. In three treatments, our experiment varies one bargainer's ability to commit, holding the soft leverage condition fixed. As in previous studies, we observe that opening offers are consistent with the available soft leverage. The influence of hard leverage is most evident ...
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作者：Victoria Anauati, Maria; Feld, Brian; Galiani, Sebastian; Torrens, Gustavo
作者单位：Universidad de San Andres Argentina; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：We conducted a laboratory experiment to test the comparative statics predictions of a new approach to collective action games based on the method of stability sets. We find robust support for the main theoretical predictions. As we increase the payoff of a successful collective action (accruing to all players and only to those who contribute), the share of cooperators increases. The experiment also points to new avenues for refining the theory. We find that, as the payoff of a successful colle...
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作者：Chen, Peter; Egesdal, Michael; Pycia, Marek; Yenmez, M. Bumin
作者单位：University of Chicago; Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：We show that generalized median stable matchings exist in many-to-many matching markets when contracts are strong substitutes and satisfy the law of aggregate demand. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Acharya, Avidit
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：I study a model in which high and low income voters must decide between continuing with a status quo policy or switching to a different policy, which is more redistributive. Under the status quo policy, low income voters may get an opportunity to become high income earners. Such opportunities are expected to arise infrequently, so in expectation these voters prefer the more redistributive policy. Nevertheless, there is an equilibrium in which the vast majority of them cast their ballots in fav...
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作者：Bartling, Bjorn; Netzer, Nick
作者单位：University of Zurich
摘要：Behavioral robustness is essential in mechanism design. Existing papers focus on robustness as captured by dominant strategies. This paper studies the novel concept of externality robustness, which addresses players' motives to affect other players' monetary payoffs. One example is externalities due to spite, which has been used to explain overbidding in second-price auctions. We show theoretically and experimentally that a trade-off exists between dominant-strategy implementation and external...
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作者：Galanis, Spyros
作者单位：University of Southampton
摘要：The value of information is examined in a risk-sharing environment with unawareness and complete markets. Information and awareness are symmetric among agents, who have a clear understanding of their actions and deterministic payoffs. We show with examples that public information can make some agents strictly better off at the expense of others, contrasting the standard results of Hirshleifer (1971) and Schlee (2001) that the value of public information is negative for all when risk averse age...
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作者：Yan, Huibin; Friedman, Daniel; Munro, David
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
摘要：A longstanding criticism of the core is that it is too sensitive to small changes in player numbers, as in a well known example where one extra seller (resp. buyer) causes the entire surplus to go to the buyer's (seller's) side. We test this example in the lab, using several different trading institutions. We find that successful collusion is relatively infrequent and decreasing over time even with institutions that facilitate collusion and, consistent with core theory, a disproportionate shar...
