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作者：Camerer, Colin; Nunnari, Salvatore; Palfrey, Thomas R.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Bocconi University
摘要：We report new experimental data on a simple common value auction to investigate the extent to which bidding can be explained by logit QRE, in combination with different models about bidder beliefs: cursed equilibrium, level-k, and cognitive hierarchy. There is a close correspondence between the predicted bidding patterns in those models and the distribution of observed bids. The pattern of median bids in the data consists of a combination of overbidding with low signals, and near-value-bidding...
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作者：Gomes, Renato; Gottlieb, Daniel; Maestri, Lucas
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Washington University (WUSTL); Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：Firms must strike a delicate balance between the exploitation of well-known business models and the exploration of risky, untested approaches. In this paper, we study financial contracting between an investor and a firm with private information about its returns from exploration and exploitation. The investor-optimal mechanism offers contracts with different tolerance for failures to screen returns from exploitation, and with different exposure to the project's revenues to screen returns from ...
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作者：Spiekermann, Kai; Weiss, Arne
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Carl von Ossietzky Universitat Oldenburg; University of Cologne
摘要：We propose a cognitive-dissonance model of norm compliance to identify conditions for selfishly biased information acquisition. The model distinguishes between objective norm compliers, for whom the right action is a function of the state of the world, and subjective norm compliers, for whom it is a function of their belief. The former seek as much information as possible; the latter acquire only information that lowers, in expected terms, normative demands. The source of 'moral wiggle room' i...
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作者：Martini, Giorgio
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：I prove there exists no assignment mechanism that is strategy-proof, non-wasteful and satisfies equal treatment of equals. When outside options may exist, this strengthens the impossibility result of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) by weakening ordinal efficiency to non-wastefulness. My result solves an open question posed by Erdil (2014) and complements his results on the efficient frontier of random assignment mechanisms. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Athanasoglou, Stergios
作者单位：Bocconi University
摘要：Suppose a group of agents submit strict linear orderings over a set of alternatives. An aggregation rule is a function mapping this information into a unique social ordering. In a recent paper, Bossert and Sprumont (2014) introduced betweenness-based notions of efficiency and strategyproofness for aggregation rules and identified three broad classes of rules which satisfy them. The current paper suggests that such betweenness-based requirements may at times be too weak and introduces stronger ...
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作者：Perea, Andres
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作者：Dato, Simon; Grunewald, Andreas; Kraekel, Matthias; Mueller, Daniel
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of Wurzburg
摘要：This paper provides evidence that inefficient promotion strategies and large wage increases upon promotion may both arise as a consequence of asymmetric employer information. Building on the seminal work by Waldman (1984a) and Milgrom and Oster (1987), we first present a model that illustrates how both phenomena may jointly arise due to the information revealing character of promotions. Using experimental labor markets, we find evidence consistent with asymmetric employer information being a c...
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作者：Schroyen, Fred; Treich, Nicolas
作者单位：Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); INRAE; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：The relationship between wealth and power has long been debated. Nevertheless, this relationship has been rarely studied in a strategic game. In this paper, we study wealth effects in a strategic contest game. Two opposing effects arise: wealth reduces the marginal cost of effort but it also reduces the marginal benefit of winning the contest. We consider three types of contests which vary depending on whether rents and efforts are commensurable with wealth. Our theoretical analysis shows that...
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作者：Dietrich, Franz
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：When individual judgments ('yes' or 'no') on some propositions are aggregated into collective judgments, outcomes may be sensitive to the choice of propositions under consideration (the agenda). Such agenda-sensitivity opens the door to manipulation by agenda setters. I define three types of agenda-insensitivity ('basic', 'full', and 'focal') and for each type axiomatically characterize the aggregation procedures satisfying it. Two axioms turn out to be central for agenda-insensitivity: the fa...
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作者：Alger, Ingela; Weibull, Jorgen W.
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Stockholm School of Economics; Royal Institute of Technology
摘要：What kind of preferences should one expect evolution to favor? We propose a definition of evolutionary stability of preferences in interactions in groups of arbitrary finite size. Groups are formed under random matching that may be assortative. Individuals' preferences are their private information. The set of potential preferences are all those that can be represented by continuous functions. We show that a certain class of such preferences, that combine self-interest with morality of a Kanti...
