Monotone strategyproofness

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Haeringer, Guillaume; Halaburda, Hanna
• 署名单位: City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); Bank of Canada; New York University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.05.007
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 68-77
• 关键词: strategyproofness; Kemeny sets; Misrepresentations; Dominant strategy

摘要

We propose a way to compare the extent of preference misrepresentation between two strategies. We define a preference revelation mechanism to be monotone strategyproof if declaring a more truthful preference ordering dominates (with respect to the true preferences) declaring a less truthful preference ordering. Our main result states that a mechanism is strategyproof if, and only if, it is monotone strategyproof. This result holds for any deterministic social choice function on any domain; for probabilistic social choice functions it holds under a mild assumption on the domain. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.