Procrastination in teams and contract design

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Weinschenk, Philipp
• 署名单位: University of Mannheim; University of Kaiserslautern; Max Planck Society
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.014
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 264-283
• 关键词: Moral hazard; TEAM PRODUCTION; partnerships; procrastination; Contract design; DISCRIMINATION; deadlines

摘要

We study a dynamic model of team production with moral hazard. We show that players might procrastinate to exploit the future externalities of team production. Contract design is shown to be a powerful tool to mitigate the problem of procrastination and enhance efficiency. The team's ability to write discriminatory contracts is therefore central. We also show that deadlines are not beneficial for a team, provided that players can choose efforts frequently and design contracts optimally. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.