Internal hierarchy and stable coalition structures

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Morelli, Massimo; Park, In-Uck
• 署名单位: Bocconi University; Bocconi University; University of Bristol; Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.007
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 90-96
• 关键词: Stable systems; abilities; Cyclic partition; Non-segregation

摘要

In deciding whether to join a coalition or not, an agent must consider both i) the expected power of the coalition and ii) her position in the vertical structure within the coalition. We establish the existence of a positive relationship between the degree of inequality in remuneration within coalitions and the number of coalitions to be formed endogenously in stable systems. We show that such coalitions can be mixed and balanced, rather than segregated, in terms of members' ability levels. In any stable system each coalition is of an efficient size and every agent is paid her marginal contribution. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.