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作者：Erdamar, Bora; Sanver, M. Remzi; Sato, Shin
作者单位：University of Rochester; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Information Sciences & Technologies (INS2I); Fukuoka University; Bahcesehir University
摘要：We consider manipulation of collective decision making rules in a framework where voters not only rank candidates but also evaluate them as acceptable or unacceptable. In this richer informational setting, we adopt a new notion of strategy-proofness, called evaluationwise strategy-proofness, where incentives of manipulation exist if and only if a voter can replace an outcome which he finds unacceptable with an acceptable one. Evaluationwise strategy-proofness is weaker than strategy-proofness....
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作者：Ding, Tingting; Schotter, Andrew
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; New York University
摘要：While, in theory, the school matching problem is a static non-cooperative one-shot game, in reality the matching game is played by parents who choose their strategies after consulting or chatting with other parents in their social networks. In this paper we compare the performance of the Boston and the Gale-Shapley mechanisms in the presence of chatting through social networks. Our results indicate that allowing subjects to chat has an important impact on the likelihood that subjects change th...
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作者：Flesch, Janos; Vermeulen, Dries; Zseleva, Anna
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：We consider two-player zero-sum games with infinite action spaces and bounded payoff functions. The players' strategies are finitely additive probability measures, called charges. Since a strategy profile does not always induce a unique expected payoff, we distinguish two extreme attitudes of players. A player is viewed as pessimistic if he always evaluates the range of possible expected payoffs by the worst one, and a player is viewed as optimistic if he always evaluates it by the best one. T...
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作者：Lugovskyy, Volodymyr; Puzzello, Daniela; Sorensen, Andrea; Walker, James; Williams, Arlington
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Southern Illinois University System; Southern Illinois University
摘要：A growing literature in experimental economics examines the conditions under which cooperation can be sustained in social-dilemma settings. In particular, several recent studies contrast cooperation levels in games in which the number of decision rounds is probabilistic to games in which the number of decision rounds is finite. We contribute to this literature by contrasting the evolution of cooperation in probabilistically and finitely repeated linear voluntary-contribution public-goods games...
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作者：Chen, Roy; Chen, Yan; Liu, Yang; Mei, Qiaozhu
作者单位：National University of Singapore; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Tsinghua University
摘要：We investigate the effects of team competition on pro-social lending activity on Kiva.org, the first microlending website to match lenders with entrepreneurs in developing countries. Using naturally occurring field data, we find that lenders who join teams contribute 1.2 more loans ($30-$42) per month than those who do not. To further explore factors that differentiate successful teams from dormant ones, we run a large scale randomized field experiment (n = 22,233) by posting forum messages. C...
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作者：Kraehmer, Daniel; Strausz, Roland
作者单位：University of Bonn; Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：We show that every sequential screening model is equivalent to a standard text book static screening model. We use this result and apply well-established techniques from static screening to obtain solutions for classes of sequential screening models for which standard sequential screening techniques are not applicable. Moreover, we identify the counterparts of well-understood features of the static screening model in the corresponding sequential screening model such as the single-crossing cond...
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作者：Kim, Semin
作者单位：Yonsei University
摘要：We consider the performance and incentive compatibility of voting rules in a Bayesian environment: agents have independent private values, there are at least three alternatives, and monetary transfers are prohibited. First, we show that in a neutral environment, meaning alternatives are symmetric ex-ante, essentially any ex-post Pareto efficient ordinal rule is incentive compatible. Importantly, however, we can improve upon ordinal rules. We show that we can design an incentive compatible card...
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作者：Kalai, Ehud; Battaglini, Marco; Charness, Gary; Crawford, Vincent; Forges, Francoise; Parkes, David; Byrd, Jennifer; Milnor, John; Arrow, Kenneth J.; Aumann, Robert J.; Dixit, Avinash K.; Dubey, Pradeep; Maskin, Eric; Meltzer, Herbert Y.; Myerson, Roger; Roth, Alvin E.; Shubik, Martin; Smith, Vernon L.; Spence, Mike; Sudderth, Bill; Valenciano, Federico
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Stanford University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Princeton University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Northwestern University; Harvard University; Northwestern University; Feinberg School of Medicine; University of Chicago; Stanford University; Yale University; Chapman University System; Chapman University; New York University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Basque Country
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作者：Cason, Timothy N.; Zubrickas, Robertas
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of Bath
摘要：The provision point mechanism as a method of funding threshold public goods is extended with refund bonuses. Each contributor not only has his contribution refunded in the case of insufficient contributions but also receives a refund bonus proportional to his proposed contribution. As long as the refund bonus pool does not exceed the net value of the public good, in equilibrium the public good is always provided and refund bonuses are never distributed. In this paper, we empirically investigat...
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作者：Healy, Paul J.; Jain, Ritesh
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：Groves and Ledyard (1977) construct a mechanism for public goods procurement that can be viewed as a direct-revelation Groves mechanism in which agents announce a parameter of a quadratic approximation of their true preferences. The mechanism's Nash equilibrium outcomes are efficient. The budget is balanced because Groves mechanisms are balanced for the announced quadratic preferences. Tian (1996) subsequently discovered a richer set of budget-balancing preferences. We replicate the Groves-Led...
