Games and Economic Behavior

最新文章

• Mandatory minimum contributions, heterogeneous endowments and voluntary public-good provision AI翻译
  作者：Keser, Claudia; Markstaedter, Andreas; Schmidt, Martin
  作者单位：University of Gottingen; Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
  摘要：In a public-good experiment with heterogeneous endowments, we investigate if and how the contribution level as well as the previously observed fair-share rule of equal contributions relative to one's endowment (Hofmeyr et al., 2007; Keser et al., 2014) are influenced by minimum-contribution requirements. We consider three different schedules: FixMin, requiring the same absolute contributions, RelMin, requiring the same relative contributions, and ProgMin, requiring minimum contributions that p...
• Sequential commitment games AI翻译
  作者：Arieli, Itai; Babichenko, Yakov; Tennenholtz, Moshe
  作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology
  摘要：We consider an extensive-form game in which players have the option to commit to actions before the game is played. We focus on commitment procedures where players make voluntary irreversible commitments in a prescribed order over the decision nodes. We study whether such commitment procedures may lead to Pareto-efficient outcomes. Our main result is surprisingly positive: for two-player games, we introduce an order over the decision nodes for which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outco...
• Social motives vs social influence: An experiment on interdependent time preferences AI翻译
  作者：Rodriguez-Lara, Ismael; Ponti, Giovanni
  作者单位：Middlesex University; Universitat d'Alacant; University of Chicago; Luiss Guido Carli University
  摘要：We design an intertemporal Dictator Game to test whether Dictators modify their discounting behavior when their own decision is imposed on their matched Recipients. We run four different treatments to identify the effect of payoffs externalities from those related to information and beliefs. Our descriptive statistics show that Dictators display a marked propensity to account for the intertemporal preferences of Recipients, both in the presence of externalities (social motives) and/or when the...
• Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents AI翻译
  作者：Mukherjee, Saptarshi; Muto, Nozomu; Ramaekers, Eve
  作者单位：Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Delhi; Yokohama National University; Universite Catholique Louvain
  摘要：We consider implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms. We provide a complete characterization of the class of social choice correspondences that are implementable when agents are partially honest, in the sense that they have strict preferences for being sincere when truthfulness does not result in a worse outcome. As an application, we show that the Pareto correspondence is implemented by a finite mechanism. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
• Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach AI翻译
  作者：Kirkegaard, Rene
  作者单位：University of Guelph
  摘要：The spanning condition describes a situation where the agent's effort determines the weights placed on two distinct technologies. Sufficient conditions are known under which the first-order approach (FOA) is valid when the spanning condition holds. In this paper, a complete solution to the problem is provided. Thus, the problem is solved even when the FOA is not valid. The solution has two main steps. The first step fully characterizes the set of implementable actions. The second step establis...
• The management of innovation: Experimental evidence AI翻译
  作者：Kusterer, David J.; Schmitz, Patrick W.
  作者单位：University of Cologne; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
  摘要：We report data from a laboratory experiment with 576 participants that was designed to test Aghion and Tirole's (1994a) management of innovation theory which is based on the Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights approach. A research unit and a customer can invest to increase the probability of making an innovation. When the innovation is made, the parties bargain over the division of the revenue. In line with the theoretical predictions, we find that ownership matters for the division of the rev...
• Optimal dynamic information provision AI翻译
  作者：Renault, Jerome; Solan, Eilon; Vieille, Nicolas
  作者单位：Universite PSL; Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Toulouse School of Economics; Tel Aviv University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
  摘要：We study a dynamic model of information provision. A state of nature evolves according to a Markov chain. An advisor with commitment power decides how much information to provide to an uninformed decision maker, so as to influence his short-term decisions. We deal with a stylized class of situations, in which the decision maker has a risky action and a safe action, and the payoff to the advisor only depends on the action chosen by the decision maker. The greedy disclosure policy is the policy ...
• On the robustness of learning in games with stochastically perturbed payoff observations AI翻译
  作者：Bravo, Mario; Mertikopoulos, Panayotis
  作者单位：Universidad de Santiago de Chile; Communaute Universite Grenoble Alpes; Institut National Polytechnique de Grenoble; Universite Grenoble Alpes (UGA); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Communaute Universite Grenoble Alpes; Institut National Polytechnique de Grenoble; Universite Grenoble Alpes (UGA); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
  摘要：Motivated by the scarcity of accurate payoff feedback in practical applications of game theory, we examine a class of learning dynamics where players adjust their choices based on past payoff observations that are subject to noise and random disturbances. First, in the single-player case (corresponding to an agent trying to adapt to an arbitrarily changing environment), we show that the stochastic dynamics under study lead to no regret almost surely, irrespective of the noise level in the play...
• Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem AI翻译
  作者：Chun, Youngsub; Yengin, Duygu
  作者单位：Seoul National University (SNU); University of Adelaide
  摘要：We investigate the implications of welfare lower bounds together with queue-efficiency and strategy-proofness in the context of the queueing problem. First, we introduce the k-welfare lower bound, which requires that each agent should be guaranteed her utility at the kth queue position with zero transfer. For each k, we show that the k-pivotal rules (Mitra and Mutuswami, 2011) achieve the minimal deficit in each problem among all rules satisfying queue-efficiency, strategy-proofness, and the k...
• Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture AI翻译
  作者：Hougaard, Jens Leth; Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.; Tvede, Mich; Osterdal, Lars Peter
  作者单位：University of Copenhagen; Universidad Pablo de Olavide; Universite Catholique Louvain; University of Newcastle; Copenhagen Business School
  摘要：We consider the problem of distributing the proceeds generated from a joint venture in which the participating agents are hierarchically organized. We introduce and characterize a family of allocation rules where revenue 'bubbles up' in the hierarchy. The family is flexible enough to accommodate the no-transfer rule (where no revenue bubbles up) and the full-transfer rule (where all the revenues bubble up to the top of the hierarchy). Intermediate rules within the family are reminiscent of pop...