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作者：Newton, Jonathan
摘要：The ability to form shared intentions and adjust one's choices in collaboration with others is a fundamental aspect of human nature. We discuss the forces that act for and against the evolution of this ability. In contrast to altruism and other non-fitness maximizing preferences, for large classes of games the ability to form shared intentions proliferates when rare without requiring group selection or assortativity in matching. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Bellemare, Charles; Sebald, Alexander; Suetens, Sigrid
作者单位：Laval University; University of Copenhagen; Tilburg University; Tilburg University
摘要：We compare three approaches to test for guilt aversion in two economic experiments. The first approach elicits second-order beliefs using self-reports. The second approach discloses first-order beliefs of matched players to decision makers, which are taken as exogenous second-order beliefs of decision makers. The third approach lets decision makers make choices conditional on a sequence of possible first-order beliefs of matched players. We find that the first and third approach generate simil...
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作者：Kimya, Mert
作者单位：Koc University
摘要：I analyze Nash implementation when agents might use an exogenous tie-breaking rule to choose among the messages they are materially indifferent between. If the planner is endowed with the knowledge of the rule, this might expand or shrink the set of implementable social choice correspondences depending on the particular rule used by the agents. If the planner is not endowed with the knowledge of the rule, then the problem of implementation is almost equivalent to double implementation in Nash ...
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作者：Kimbrough, Erik O.; Robalino, Nikolaus; Robson, Arthur J.
作者单位：Chapman University System; Chapman University; Rochester Institute of Technology; Simon Fraser University
摘要：We investigate our capacity to attribute preferences to others. This ability is intrinsic to game theory, and is a central component of Theory of Mind, perhaps the capstone of social cognition. This component of theory of mind allows individuals to learn more rapidly in strategic environments with an element of novelty. We show that the capacity to attribute preferences yields an advantage over less sophisticated approaches to strategic interaction (e.g. reinforcement learning) because it allo...
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作者：Ispano, Alessandro; Schwardmann, Peter
作者单位：CY Cergy Paris Universite; University of Munich
摘要：Evidence from studies in international relations, the politics of reform, collective action and price competition suggests that economic agents in social dilemma situations cooperate more to avoid losses than in the pursuit of gains. To test whether the prospect of losses can induce cooperation, we let experimental subjects play the traveler's dilemma in the gain and loss domain. Subjects cooperate substantially more over losses. Furthermore, our results suggest that this treatment effect is b...
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作者：Panebianco, Fabrizio; Verdier, Thierry
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We study cultural diffusion in a random network where the transition probabilities are determined by a cultural transmission technology with endogenous vertical transmission rates (a la Bisin and Verdier, 2001). We present a two-way epidemic model in which both the infection and the recovery rates are endogenous and depend on the topology of the network. We characterize two balancing conditions satisfied by the network degree distribution and the vertical transmission rate distribution to ensu...
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作者：Arieli, Itai
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：We study a social learning model with payoff externalities in which one of two state dependent games is chosen at random and then played repeatedly by a different group of agents. Each generation observes the history of actions and receives conditionally independent private signals about the realized game. We show that with probability one, the play converges to the set of equilibria of an appropriate convex combination of the two state games. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition on...
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作者：Gentzkow, Matthew; Kamenica, Emir
作者单位：Stanford University; University of Chicago
摘要：A number of senders with no ex ante private information publicly choose signals whose realizations they observe privately. Senders then convey verifiable messages about their signal realizations to a receiver who takes a non-contractible action that affects the welfare of all players. The space of available signals includes all conditional distributions of signal realizations and allows any sender to choose a signal that is arbitrarily correlated with signals of others. We characterize the inf...
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作者：Kellner, Christian; Le Quement, Mark T.
作者单位：University of Southampton; University of East Anglia
摘要：We study cheap talk communication in a simple two actions-two states model featuring an ambiguous state distribution. Equilibrium behavior of both sender (S) and receiver (R) features mixing and we relate each agent's randomization to a specific mode of ambiguous communication. For sufficiently high ambiguity, implementing the S-optimal decision rule with only two messages is impossible if R has aligned preferences. This may in contrast be possible if R has misaligned preferences. Adding a lit...
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作者：Selcuk, Cemil
作者单位：Cardiff University
摘要：We investigate price mechanism selection in a setting where sellers compete for budget constrained buyers by adopting either fixed pricing or auctions (first or second price). We show that first and second price auctions are payoff equivalent when some bidders are financially constrained, so sellers are indifferent to adopt either format. We characterize possible equilibria and show that if the budget is high, then sellers compete via fixed pricing, if it is low then they compete via auctions,...
