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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Makhdoumi, Ali; Malekian, Azarakhsh; Ozdaglar, Asuman
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Toronto
摘要：We study the effects of privacy concerns on social network formation. Each individual decides which others to form links with. Links bring direct benefits from friendship but also lead to the sharing of information via a percolation process. Privacy concerns are modeled as a disutility that the individual suffers as a result of her private information being acquired by others. We specify conditions under which pure-strategy equilibria exist and characterize both pure-strategy and mixed-strateg...
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作者：Mengel, Friederike; Rivas, Javier
作者单位：University of Essex; University of Bath
摘要：We study efficiency and information aggregation in common value elections with continuous private signals and informative priors. We show that small elections are not generally efficient and that there are equilibria where some voters vote against their private signal even if it provides useful information and abstention is allowed. This is not the case in large elections, where the fraction of voters who vote against their private signal tends to zero. In an experiment, we then study how info...
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作者：Little, Andrew T.
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：I develop a theory of propaganda which affects mass behavior without necessarily affecting mass beliefs. A group of citizens observe a signal of their government's performance, which is upwardly inflated by propaganda. Citizens want to support the government if it performs well and if others are supportive (i.e., to coordinate). Some citizens are unaware of the propaganda (credulous). Because of the coordination motive, the non-credulous still respond to propaganda, and when the coordination m...
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作者：Schmidbauer, Eric
作者单位：State University System of Florida; University of Central Florida
摘要：Each of n experts communicates with a principal about the privately observed quality of the expert's own project via cheap talk, with new independently drawn projects available each period until the principal adopts one. Even when experts are highly biased in that they only receive a positive payoff if their own project is selected, we show that informative equilibria may exist, characterize a large class of stationary equilibria, and find the Pareto dominant symmetric equilibrium. Experts fac...
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作者：Currarini, Sergio; Fumagalli, Elena; Panebianco, Fabrizio
作者单位：University of Leicester; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; Utrecht University; Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：We study linear quadratic games played on a network. Agents face peer effects with distance-one neighbors, and strategic substitution with distance-two neighbors (local congestion). For this class of games, we show that an interior equilibrium exists both in the high and in the low regions of the largest eigenvalue, but may not exist in the intermediate region. In the low region, equilibrium is proportional to a weighted version of Bonacich centrality, where weights are themselves centrality m...
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作者：Xefteris, Dimitrios
作者单位：University of Cyprus
摘要：It is known that multidimensional Downsian competition fails to admit an equilibrium in pure strategies unless very stringent conditions on the distribution of voters' bliss points are imposed (Plott, 1967). This paper revisits this problem considering that the two vote share maximizing candidates are differentiated. That is, candidates strategically decide positions only in some of the n dimensions while in the rest of them their positions are assumed to be fixed. These fixed dimensions may b...
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作者：Charness, Gary; Dave, Chetan
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
摘要：We investigate whether the confirmation bias is mitigated in signal-extraction environments by outside financial interests. We include a background strategic consideration leading to 'motivated beliefs' for people in one role, as they receive higher equilibrium payoffs in a background game in one of two states, while people in the other role receive the same equilibrium payoffs in both. We find systematic differences in beliefs and our results suggest that players with motivated beliefs deviat...
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作者：Jelnov, Artyom; Tauman, Yair; Zeckhauser, Richard
作者单位：Ariel University; Reichman University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Harvard University
摘要：Nation 1 wants to develop a nuclear bomb (or other weapons of mass destruction). Nation 2, its enemy, wants to prevent this, either by requiring that 1 open his facilities, or through a pinpoint strike if her imperfect intelligence system (IS) indicates a bomb is present or imminent. If 1 refuses full inspection, 2 can attack 1 or not. l's cost for allowing inspection, private information, can be either high, H, or low, L. The game's unique sequential equilibrium will be separating or pooling,...
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作者：Klaus, Bettina
作者单位：University of Lausanne
摘要：For classical marriage markets with equal numbers of men and women and where all men find all women acceptable and all women find all men acceptable, Sasaki and Toda (1992) characterized the core by same-side anonymity for marriage markets, Pareto optimality, consistency, and converse consistency. Nizamogullari and Ozkal-Sanver (2014) generalized this result to the domain of classical marriage markets by adding individual rationality and replacing same-side anonymity for marriage markets with ...
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作者：Herbst, Luisa; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian
作者单位：Max Planck Society; Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：We study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict. Our experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is higher if power is more imbalanced. Even though endogenous bargaining outcomes reflect the players' unequal fighting strengths, strategic ...
