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作者：Casella, Alessandra; Laslier, Jean-Francois; Mace, Antonin
作者单位：Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite
摘要：In polarized committees, majority voting disenfranchises the minority. Allowing voters to spend freely a fixed budget of votes over multiple issues restores some minority power. However, it also creates a complex strategic scenario: a hide-and-seek game between majority and minority voters that corresponds to a decentralized version of the Colonel Blotto game. We offer theoretical results and bring the game to the laboratory. The minority wins as frequently as theory predicts, despite subjects...
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作者：Ederer, Florian; Stremitzer, Alexander
作者单位：Yale University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We investigate why people keep their promises in the absence of external enforcement mechanisms and reputational effects. In a controlled laboratory experiment we show that exogenous variation of second-order expectations (promisors' expectations about promisees' expectations) leads to a significant change in promisor behavior. We provide evidence that a promisor's aversion to disappointing a promisee's expectation leads her to behave more generously. We propose and estimate a simple model of ...
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作者：Muto, Nozomu; Sato, Shin
作者单位：Yokohama National University; Fukuoka University
摘要：We introduce a new axiom called bounded response, which states that for each smallest change of a preference profile, the change in the social choice must be smallest, if any, for the agent who induces the change in the preference profile. We show that bounded response is weaker than strategy-proofness, and that bounded response and efficiency imply dictatorship. This impossibility has a far-reaching negative implication: on the universal domain of preferences, it is difficult to identify a no...
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作者：Dutting, Paul; Talgam-Cohen, Inbal; Roughgarden, Tim
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Stanford University
摘要：Designing double auctions is a complex problem, especially when there are restrictions on the sets of buyers and sellers that may trade with one another. The goal of this paper is to develop a modular approach to the design of double auctions, by relating it to the exhaustively-studied problem of designing one-sided mechanisms with a single seller (or, alternatively, a single buyer). We consider several desirable properties of a double auction: feasibility, dominant-strategy incentive compatib...
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作者：Long, Yan; Mishra, Debasis; Sharma, Tridib
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：In the private values single object auction model, we construct a satisfactory mechanism - a symmetric, dominant strategy incentive compatible, and budget-balanced mechanism. The mechanism converges to efficiency at an exponential rate. It allocates the object to the highest valued agent with more than 99% probability provided there are at least 14 agents. It is also ex-post individually rational. We show that our mechanism is optimal in a restricted class of satisfactory ranking mechanisms. S...
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作者：Kadam, Sangram Vilasrao
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：We prove that the unilateral substitutability property introduced in Hatfield and Kojima (2010) implies the substitutable completability property from Hatfield and Kominers (2014). This paper provides a novel linkage between these two sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable matching in many-to-one matching markets with contracts. A substitutable completion of a preference is a substitutable preference created by adding some sets of contracts to the original preference order. We pro...
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作者：Wu, Jiabin
作者单位：University of Oregon
摘要：This paper argues that political institutions play an important role in influencing the evolution of character traits. We consider a population with two groups each with different character traits. A political institution provides the platform and a set of rules for the two groups to battle over the relative representativeness of their traits for the high positions in the social hierarchy. This political process affects the economic outcomes of the two groups and, subsequently their character ...
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作者：Demange, Gabrielle
作者单位：Paris School of Economics
摘要：The paper analyzes the optimal targeting strategies of a planner (a governmental agency, a firm) who aims to increase the aggregate action of a population. The agents interact through a social network and react to their exposure to neighbors' actions. The reaction function describes, for example, the best response in a strategic game, a mechanical influence in a contagion disease or a mimetic behavior. The reaction is assumed to be increasing in exposure, resulting in complementarity in action...
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作者：Hinnosaar, Toomas
作者单位：Collegio Carlo Alberto
摘要：I study the dynamic mechanism design problem of a monopolist selling a fixed number of service slots to randomly arriving, short-lived buyers with heterogeneous values. The fully optimal mechanism is a non-standard auction in which bidders' payoffs are non-monotone in their opponents' bids. Because its complexity may make the fully optimal mechanism too costly to implement, I also study the optimal mechanisms in restricted classes. The most restrictive are pure calendar mechanisms, which alloc...
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作者：Leduc, Matt V.; Jackson, Matthew O.; Johari, Ramesh
作者单位：Stanford University; Stanford University; International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA); Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR); The Santa Fe Institute
摘要：When a new product or technology is introduced, potential consumers can learn its quality by trying it, at a risk, or by letting others try it and free-riding on the information that they generate. We propose a dynamic game to study the adoption of technologies of uncertain value, when agents are connected by a network and a monopolist seller chooses a profit maximizing policy. Consumers with low degree (few friends) have incentives to adopt early, while consumers with high degree have incenti...
