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作者：Afacan, Mustafa Oguz
作者单位：Sabanci University
摘要：We investigate extension/resource monotonicity and respecting improvements properties of the cumulative offer process (COP). Extension monotonicity says that no doctor is to be better off whenever others start preferring more contracts to being unmatched. Resource monotonicity, on the other hand, requires that no doctor becomes worse off whenever hospitals start hiring more doctors. The COP becomes extension and resource monotonic whenever contracts are unilateral substitutes (US) satisfying a...
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作者：Platz, Trine Tornoe; Osterdal, Lars Peter
作者单位：University of Southern Denmark; Copenhagen Business School
摘要：We consider a game in which a large number of identical agents choose when to queue up at a single server after it opens. Agents are impatient for service and also incur a cost proportional to time spent in the queue. We show that the first-in-first-out queue discipline and the last-in-first-out queue discipline both lead to a unique equilibrium arrival distribution. However, among all work-conserving queue disciplines, the first-in-first-out performs the worst in terms of equilibrium utility ...
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作者：Goeree, Jacob K.; Holt, Charles A.; Smith, Angela M.
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney; University of Cologne; University of Virginia; James Madison University
摘要：In a volunteer's dilemma, only one volunteer is needed to obtain a benefit for all. Volunteering is costly, and the symmetric Nash equilibrium involves randomization. These predictions have the intuitive property that volunteer rates decline with larger groups, but surprisingly, the probability of obtaining no volunteers is increasing with group size, even as the number of players goes to infinity. These predictions are evaluated in a laboratory experiment with a range of group sizes. Observed...
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作者：Harless, Patrick
作者单位：University of Glasgow
摘要：When rationing a resource or adjudicating conflicting claims, the arrival of new agents necessitates revision. Adopting a worst-case perspective, we introduce guarantee structures to measure the protection a rule provides to either individuals or groups in these circumstances. With the goal of maximizing guarantees for those in the original group, we characterize the constrained equal awards rule. Requiring that a rule provide protection for both the original and arriving agents, so that both ...
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作者：Drugov, Mikhail; Ryvkin, Dmitry
作者单位：New Economic School; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; State University System of Florida; Florida State University
摘要：In a biased contest, one of the players has an advantage in the winner determination process. We characterize a novel class of biased contest success functions pertaining to such contests and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for zero bias to be a critical point of arbitrary objectives satisfying certain symmetry restrictions. We, however, challenge the common wisdom that unbiased contests are always optimal when contestants are symmetric ex ante or even ex post. We show that contest...
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作者：Krajbich, Ian; Camerer, Colin; Rangel, Antonio
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; California Institute of Technology; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：A basic goal in mechanism design is to construct mechanisms that simultaneously satisfy efficiency, voluntary participation, and dominant strategy incentive compatibility. Previous work has shown that this is impossible, unless the agents and planner have sufficient information about each other and common knowledge. These results have remained largely theoretical because the required information is generally not available in practical applications. However, recent work has shown that these lim...
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作者：Palfrey, Thomas; Rosenthal, Howard; Roy, Nilanjan
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; New York University; City University of Hong Kong
摘要：This paper uses a Bayesian mechanism design approach to investigate the effects of communication in a threshold public goods game. Individuals have private information about contribution costs. Individuals can each make a discrete contribution. If the number of contributors is at least equal to the threshold, a public benefit accrues to all members of the group. We experimentally implement three different communication structures prior to the decision move: (a) simultaneous exchange of binary ...
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作者：Midjord, Rune; Rodriguez Barraquer, Tomas; Valasek, Justin
作者单位：University of Copenhagen; Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：We consider a committee of experts that decides to approve or reject an innovation on behalf of society. In addition to a payoff linked to the correctness of the committee's decision, each expert receives disesteem payoffs if he/she votes in favor of an ill-fated innovation or votes against an innovation that proves to be beneficial. We find that the predictions of the model are sensitive to the signal technology. In the standard Condorcet framework experts' signals are i.i.d. conditional on t...
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作者：Wilson, Alistair J.; Wu, Hong
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Hong Kong Polytechnic University
摘要：We theoretically and experimentally examine the effects from adding a simple, empirically relevant action to a repeated partnership, the option to walk away. Manipulating both the value of the outside option, and its relative distribution among the partners, we examine the behavior of human subjects in a repeated prisoners' dilemma. In particular, we examine the degree of cooperation and the form of punishments used. Our findings indicate that cooperation rates are broadly unaffected by the va...
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作者：Leme, Renato Paes
作者单位：Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
摘要：The concept of gross substitute valuations was introduced by Kelso and Crawford as a sufficient conditions for the existence of Walrasian equilibria in economies with indivisible goods. The proof is algorithmic in nature: gross substitutes is exactly the condition that enables a natural price adjustment procedure - known as Walrasian tatonnement - to converge to equilibrium. The same concept was also introduced independently in other communities with different names: M-(sic)-concave functions ...
