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作者：Che, Yeon-Koo; Choi, Syngjoo; Kim, Jinwoo
作者单位：Columbia University; Seoul National University (SNU)
摘要：We study the Generalized Second Price auctions a standard method for allocating online search advertising experimentally, considering both the static environment assumed by the prevailing theory and a dynamic game capturing the salient aspects of real-world search advertising auctions. Subjects of our experiment bid consistently with the leading equilibrium notions, but exhibit significant overbidding relative to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) outcome favored as an equilibrium selection in th...
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作者：Leo, Greg
作者单位：Vanderbilt University
摘要：Two individuals face a regular task that requires the effort of only one. They take turns but sometimes arrange to swap obligations. These swaps account for their changing, private costs. While seemingly primitive, flexible turn-taking is surprisingly efficient, even relative to what can be achieved by mechanisms using monetary transfers. I model and experimentally evaluate a simple form of flexible turn-taking and then present a second form that is both consistent with patterns of subject beh...
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作者：Boosey, Luke; Brookins, Philip; Ryvkin, Dmitry
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University; Max Planck Society
摘要：In many contest situations, the number of participants is not observable at the time of investment. We design a laboratory experiment to study individual behavior in Tullock (lottery) contests with group size uncertainty. There is a fixed pool of n potential players, each with independent probability q is an element of (0, 1] of participating. We independently manipulate each of the parameters and test the implied comparative statics predictions. Our results provide considerable support for th...
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作者：Ben-Zwi, Oren
作者单位：University of Haifa
摘要：We introduce a novel characterization of all Walrasian price vectors in terms of over- and under demanded sets for monotone gross substitute combinatorial auctions. For ascending and descending auctions we suggest a universal framework for finding the minimum or maximum Walrasian price vectors for monotone gross substitute combinatorial auctions. An ascending (descending) auction is guaranteed to find the minimum (maximum) Walrasian if and only if it follows the suggested framework. (C) 2017 E...
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作者：Brett, Craig; Weymark, John A.
作者单位：Mount Allison University; Vanderbilt University
摘要：Majority voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules proposed by a continuum of individuals who have quasilinear-in-consumption preferences is considered. Men (2012) has shown that individual preferences over these schedules are single-peaked. In this article, a complete characterization of selfishly optimal schedules is provided. Each selfishly optimal schedule has a bunching region in a neighborhood of the proposer's skill type, coincides with the maxi-max schedule below thi...
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作者：Chen, Yan; Palfrey, Thomas R.
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作者：de Castro, Luciano I.; Liu, Zhiwei; Yannelis, Nicholas C.
作者单位：University of Iowa; Capital University of Economics & Business
摘要：We introduce the idea of implementation under ambiguity. In particular, we study maximin efficient notions for an ambiguous asymmetric information economy (i.e., economies where agents' preferences are maximin a to Wald, 1950). The interest on the maximin preferences lies in the fact that maximin efficient allocations are always incentive compatible (de Castro and Yannelis, 2009), a result which is false with Bayesian preferences. A noncooperative notion called maximin equilibrium is introduce...
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作者：Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Meshalkin, Andrey; Predtetchinski, Arkadi
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：We study strategies with one-period recall in the context of a general class of multilateral bargaining games. A strategy has one-period recall if actions in a particular period are only conditioned on information in the previous and the current period. We show that if players are sufficiently patient, given any proposal in the space of possible agreements, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium such that the given proposal is made and unanimously accepted in period zero. As a corollary we...
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作者：Dufwenberg, Martin; Servatka, Maros; Vadovic, Radovan
作者单位：University of Arizona; University of Gothenburg; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Carleton University
摘要：We develop, and experimentally test, models of informal agreements. Agents are assumed to be honest but suffer costs of overcoming temptations. We extend two classical bargaining solutions - split-the-difference and deal-me-out - to this informal agreement setting. For each solution there are two natural ways to do this, leaving us with 2 x 2 models to explore. In the experiment, a temptations-constrained version of deal-me-out emerges as the clear winner. (c) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights res...
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作者：Hahn, Volker
作者单位：University of Konstanz
摘要：We analyze different committee designs in a model with the endogenous participation of experts who have private information about their own abilities. Each committee design involves a test of abilities whose accuracy influences experts' decisions to participate. We derive the following findings. First, higher wages continuously lower the quality of experts on the committee. Second, and as a consequence of this, optimal committees involve low wages. Third, an increase in transparency improves t...
