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作者：Piccione, Michele; Rubinstein, Ariel
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Tel Aviv University; New York University
摘要：Individuals fail to recognize that two weak positive signals of a rare event together constitute strong evidence for the event. We demonstrate the dramatic effect of replacing Bayesian aggregation of signals with commonly used aggregation procedures in a simple model of opinion formation and a model of strategic voting.
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作者：Bouchta, Mohamed; Doghmi, Ahmed; Ziad, Abderrahmane
作者单位：Universite de Caen Normandie; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS)
摘要：Strong Nash implementation remains a central challenge in mechanism design, with no direct analogue to Maskin (1977) seminal theorem for Nash implementation under simple and widely applicable conditions. We revisit the structure of Maskin (1979) result and show that strong Nash implementability imposes a coalitional compatibility requirement, formalized by the coalitional intersection property. We then identify the Restricted Coalitional Intersection Property (RCIP) as a weaker implication of ...
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作者：Ju, Biung-Ghi; Jung, Soojeong; Song, Hokyu; Jo, Kyubang
作者单位：Seoul National University (SNU); Korea Development Institute (KDI)
摘要：Each agent in our model occupies a position in a hierarchy (a directed tree) and generates returns through collaborating with his superiors. Thus his superiors can also claim their ownership rights over his returns. Our main axiom for the allocation of these returns is the standard monotonicity with regard to the collective ownership. We establish axiomatic characterizations of monotonic allocation rules. They are represented by hierarchical transfers of the returns at each position to the sup...
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作者：Kamm, Aaron; Schram, Arthur
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; European University Institute
摘要：In a system of proportional representation, we study the interaction between a voter's turnout decision and her party choice, and how these relate to party polarization. Models of strategic interaction with instrumental voting, such as Nash and Quantal Response, predict such interaction effects, while Naive Voting models do not. In particular, the instrumental voting models predict (i) a Polarization Effect: reduced strategic party choice when voting is voluntary makes voters more likely to vo...
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作者：Milchtaich, Igal; Peretz, Ron; Tsodikovich, Yevgeny
作者单位：Bar Ilan University; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：We propose a formal framework for measuring the authority of individuals in opinion dynamics. Our framework is based on an axiomatic foundation in the tradition of coalitional game theory. We show that the unique solution concept satisfying our axioms is a generalization of the authority distribution notion of Hu and Shapley. Our approach is based on the dynamics of opinion exchange rather than on network topology. However, for any fixed opinion dynamics, our authority concept associates a net...
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作者：Hansson, Kajsa; Sund, Oda Kristine Storstad
作者单位：University of Gothenburg
摘要：How does confidence in combination with success affect meritocratic beliefs and preferences for redistribution? In a large-scale real-effort competition (n = 1365), we manipulate both confidence and the outcome of the competition to provide causal evidence. First, we show that increased confidence causes successful participants to perceive outcomes as more meritocratic, while unsuccessful participants perceive outcomes as more determined by luck. Thus, increased confidence polarizes meritocrat...
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作者：Gafni, Yotam; Yaish, Aviv
作者单位：Weizmann Institute of Science; Yale University
摘要：To allocate transactions to blocks, cryptocurrencies use auction-esque transaction fee mechanisms (TFMs). A conjecture of Roughgarden (2024) asks whether there is a TFM that is incentive compatible for both users and the miner and is also resistant to a collusion that allows them to jointly increase overall welfare. We resolve this question in the negative for deterministic TFMs, through a comprehensive characterization of designs robust to this form of collusion. For randomized TFMs, we show ...
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作者：Le Roux, Stephane; Goranko, Valentin
作者单位：Universite Paris Saclay; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Stockholm University; University of Witwatersrand
摘要：This paper proposes and studies a mechanism modelling the emergence of cooperation in noncooperative multi-player extensive form games. We consider such games enriched with additional stage bidding actions, where at each decision node of the game tree, before the player controlling that node makes a decision every other player may make a committed offer ('bid') to pay an explicitly proposed amount of utility to the controlling player if she makes the choice explicitly indicated in the bid. In ...
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作者：Belhaj, Mohamed; Bourles, Renaud; Deroian, Frederic
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite; Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We analyze risk-taking behaviors of financial institutions linked through cross-shareholding relationships. We endogenize risk exposure accounting for default risk by modeling Value-at-Risk-based risk-management-that is targeted default probabilities-in the presence of extreme risk on asset return. We relate risk-taking behaviors to a centrality measure that captures the propagation of losses within the network, and show that network integration increases risk-taking levels and expected return...
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作者：Igarashi, Ayumi; Meunier, Frederic
作者单位：University of Tokyo; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussees
摘要：We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible good and chores under category constraints. There are agents and items, partitioned into categories with capacity limits, and an allocation is feasible ilevary bundle respects thus limits ontwe agents, Shoshan et al. (2023) gave a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a Pareto-optimal allocation satisfying EF[1, 1], a relaxed form of envy-freeness. Extending this beyond two agents was open. We show that for any number of agents and any numb...
