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作者：Newton, Jonathan; Sawa, Ryoji
作者单位：Kyoto University; University of Tsukuba
摘要：By showing that a one-shot deviation property holds for almost all large games with i.i.d. randomly drawn payoffs in which a convention (in the sense of Young, 1993a) exists, long-run outcomes under behavioral rules are characterized by social choice rules.
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作者：Zhao, Shuchen
作者单位：Dongbei University of Finance & Economics; Dongbei University of Finance & Economics
摘要：Using a series of laboratory experiments, this paper examines whether preferences for positively skewed assets, commonly observed in individual decision-making, persist in market settings where assets with both positive and negative skewness coexist. Results from a traditional BDM (Becker et al., 1964) task confirm a strong preference for positively skewed assets. However, this preference does not carry over to continuous double auction (CDA) markets with balanced endowments: market prices equ...
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作者：Filiz-Ozbay, Emel; Liu, Zhenxun
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Jinan University
摘要：Digital platforms may manipulate customer reviews to impede other consumers from acquiring accurate information and to increase sales. In a rational inattention setting where consumers acquire information about product quality before making purchasing decisions, we show that the platform has incentives to restrict information acquisition in the presence of consumers with wishful thinking. These biased consumers are unaware of their bias and weigh any good news about the product quality more he...
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作者：Wu, Jiabin
作者单位：University of Oregon
摘要：This paper examines the evolution of strategies in repeated 2 x 2 anti-coordination games. Turn-taking is advantageous against strategies that consistently choose the same stage-game action, provided the discount factor is sufficiently high or the payoff asymmetry in coordination is sufficiently low. However, it becomes vulnerable when the set of strategies allowed to invade is expanded. Nonetheless, if the matching process exhibits a high degree of assortativity, turn-taking regains robustnes...
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作者：Gao, Lei; Lu, Jingfeng; Wang, Zhewei
作者单位：Shandong University; National University of Singapore
摘要：This paper examines effort-maximizing move orders in two-player Tullock contests across varying levels of contest accuracy and player asymmetries. Unlike prior work that favors strong-lead sequential formats in lottery contests, our analysis demonstrates that all three formats-stronglead, weak-lead, and simultaneous-can be optimal in the general Tullock contests. Strong-lead contests are most effective in noisy environments, but lose their advantage as contest accuracy increases. Weak-lead con...
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作者：Roel, Marcus; Chen, Zhuoqiong
作者单位：University of Nottingham Ningbo China; Harbin Institute of Technology
摘要：This paper examines behavioral differences in sequential games that arise when choices are elicited via the direct-response method, where players observe the choices made by those who acted earlier and respond with a single choice, or strategy method, where they make their choice(s) in response to all possible choices by those who acted before regardless of whether such actions were taken. We conducted a 2 x 2 between-subject large-scale online experiment with over 8000 participants on Amazon ...
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作者：Curello, Gregorio; Sinander, Ludvig
作者单位：University of Mannheim; University of Oxford
摘要：Most comparisons of preferences are instances of single-crossing dominance. We examine the lattice structure of single-crossing dominance, proving characterisation, existence and uniqueness results for minimum upper bounds of arbitrary sets of preferences. We apply these theorems to derive new comparative statics theorems for collective choice and under analyst uncertainty, and to characterise a general 'maxmin' class of uncertainty-averse preferences over Savage acts.
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作者：Di Lonardo, Livio; Sun, Jessica S.; Tyson, Scott A.
作者单位：Bocconi University; Emory University; University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：We develop a dynamic model of autocracy in which repression helps quell acute threats, increasing an autocrat's survival probability or deterring challenges altogether, but at the expense of policies that reduce popular discontent and future opposition mobilization. Our main contribution is characterizing a unique stationary Markov Perfect equilibrium, which takes one of three forms: deterrence, where the autocrat is never challenged; instability, where challenges occur every period; or a dete...
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作者：Lee, Eungik; Ngangoue, Kathleen; Schotter, Andrew
作者单位：New York University
摘要：We compare preferences for temporal resolution when uncertainty is resolved over a probability rather than a value. In various theoretical frameworks, preferences over gradual versus one-shot resolution do not depend on whether values or probabilities define the main object of uncertainty. In our experiment, however, we find that preferences for resolution vary with the type of prize: subjects prefer gradual resolution for uncertain value prizes, whereas no such preference emerges for uncertai...
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作者：Andrade, Rodrigo; Castro-Pires, Henrique; Moreira, Humberto
作者单位：The World Bank; Harvard University
摘要：We analyze optimal procurement contracts when suppliers learn about project costs over time and retain an ex-post right to exit. In the first period, the firm observes a private signal on the likelihood of high costs; in the second, it learns the realized cost type and decides whether to continue or exercise its outside option. We show that when exit opportunities are sufficiently attractive, the optimal mechanism pools all first-period signals and reduces to a cost-plus contract, with payment...
