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作者：Goette, Lorenz; Han, Hua-Jing; Leung, Benson Tsz Kin
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Hong Kong Baptist University
摘要：We show that greater memory overload results in a disproportionately greater underreaction to belief-challenging information compared to belief-confirming information. In an experiment, we keep constant the information subjects receive but vary the difficulty of memorizing the signals. In the treatment condition, the preceding signal disappears as the next signal appears; in the control condition, the preceding signal remains visible. Memory load is therefore greater in the treatment than in t...
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作者：Terstiege, Stefan
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：We study optimal mechanisms for a data broker selling market segmentation to a producer. The producer engages in discriminatory pricing and is privately informed about a payoff-relevant parameter. We first characterize a class of markets from which the segmentations in optimal mechanisms can be constructed. If the profit-maximizing prices of different producer types are ordered and only downward or only upward incentive constraints bind, this analysis shows that in any created market either al...
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作者：Koh, Youngwoo; Lim, Wooyoung
作者单位：Seoul National University (SNU); Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：We theoretically and experimentally study centralized college admissions in which colleges evaluate students under a 'translucent' admission system and students can learn each college's suitability through costly information acquisition. In centralized matching via Gale and Shapley's deferred acceptance algorithm, students decide whether to acquire information before submitting their rank-order lists. However, uncertainty about the final assignment lowers the expected gain from learning, there...
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作者：Sadakane, Hitoshi; Tam, Yin Chi
作者单位：Kobe University; University of Hong Kong
摘要：This study analyzes strategic interactions between cheap talk and lie detection, identifies the receiver-optimal equilibrium under costly lie detection, and evaluates its effectiveness. An informed sender seeks to persuade an uninformed receiver to choose higher actions, while the receiver aims to align the action as closely as possible with the true state. The sender issues a claim about the state, and the receiver then decides whether to incur a cost to inspect the claim's truthfulness. We s...
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作者：Anagnostides, Ioannis; Kalogiannis, Fivos; Panageas, Ioannis; Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Emmanouil-Vasileios; Mcaleer, Stephen
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of California System; University of California Irvine; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：Adversarial team games model multiplayer strategic interactions in which a team of identically-interested players is competing against an adversarial player in a zero-sum game. Such games capture many well-studied settings in game theory, such as congestion games, but go well-beyond to environments wherein the cooperation of one team-in the absence of explicit communication-is obstructed by competing entities; the latter setting remains poorly understood despite its numerous applications. Sinc...
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作者：Ribeiro, Mauricio
作者单位：University of Bristol
摘要：Economists often rely on people's choices to infer their preferences. However, inferring preferences from choices becomes problematic when people face unobserved constraints. In this paper, I study how to (cautiously) infer preferences from choices when the choices of the members of a social group are subject to a constraint that we only imperfectly know. When this happens, heterogeneity in the group's choices, along with more information about the constraint, helps recover the preferences of ...
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作者：Svensson, Lars-Gunnar; Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars
作者单位：Lund University; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We consider a market with indivisible objects, called houses, and monetary transfers. Each house is initially occupied by one agent and each agent demands exactly one house. The problem is to identify the complete set of direct allocation mechanisms that can be used to reallocate the houses among the agents. On the one hand, for price equilibrium mechanisms, we show that the only non-manipulable mechanism is one with a minimum equilibrium price vector. The result is not true on the classic or ...
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作者：Hafalir, Isa; Kesten, Onur; Luo, Donglai; Sherstyuk, Katerina; Tao, Cong
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney; University of Sydney; University of Hawaii System; University of Hawaii Manoa; Zhejiang University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We examine a unique auction format used in the Istanbul flower market, which could transform into either Dutch or English auction depending on bidders' bidding behaviors. By introducing a time cost that reduces the value of a perishable good as time passes, we explore how this hybrid auction format accommodates the desire for speed via an adaptive starting price. We show that the Istanbul Flower Auction outperforms both the Dutch and English auctions in terms of the auctioneer's utility. With ...
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作者：Ma, Zizhen; Riquelme, Nicolas
作者单位：Wuhan University; Universidad de los Andes - Chile
摘要：We study the link between strategic equilibria of competing auctions and the competitive distribution of auctions (Peters, 1997). With minimal restrictions on each seller's possible costs and feasible reserve prices, we show that as the number of players increases to infinity while fixing a positive buyer-to-seller ratio, symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria of finite markets converge to the competitive equilibrium of the large market.
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作者：Harris, Adam; Mccallum, Scott; Harre, Michael S.
作者单位：University of New England; Macquarie University; University of Sydney
摘要：We report on the topological structure of logit quantal response equilibria for asymmetric, two-player, two-choice games in normal form, via catastrophe theory. We present three main outcomes: first, a novel, smooth potential function for the underlying dynamics, relative to which logit equilibria arise as stationary points comprising a parameterised hyper-surface; secondly, a proof that all catastrophes within this manifold are of order at most three, i.e. folds and cusps; thirdly, discovery ...
