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作者：Cheng, Yao; Wang, Dazhong; Yu, Jingsheng
作者单位：Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China; Nanjing University; Wuhan University
摘要：This paper studies a preference revelation game induced by the Efficiency-Adjusted Deferred Acceptance (EDA) mechanism in a priority-based allocation problem. The main findings are: (i) we show the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium under EDA through a simple algorithm; (ii) the equilibrium outcome from the algorithm coincides with the outcome of the Top Trading Cycles mechanism; and (iii) the strategy profile found by the algorithm is also a strictly strong Nash equilibrium in the game in...
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作者：Zerbini, Antoine
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：Lobbying transparency regulations are hailed as a potential solution to concerns about the excessive influence of special interest groups (SIGs) over policymaking. I study how these regulations shape strategic interactions between voters, politicians and SIGs. By clarifying the process through which a policy was implemented, lobbying transparency helps voters hold politicians accountable and control the influence of SIGs. Ex-post, conditional on access, SIGs prefer to operate without lobbying ...
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作者：Bland, James R.; Turocy, Theodore L.
作者单位：University System of Ohio; University of Toledo; University of East Anglia; Alan Turing Institute
摘要：One of the original objectives of the (logit) quantal response equilibrium (LQRE) model was to provide a method for structural estimation of behavior in games, when behavior deviated from Nash equilibrium predictions. To date, only Chapter 6 of the book on quantal response equilibrium by Goeree et al. (2016) focuses on how such estimation can be implemented. We build on that chapter to provide here a more detailed treatment of the methodological issues of implementing maximum likelihood estima...
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作者：Teeselink, Bouke Klein; Van Dolder, Dennie; Van Den Assem, Martijn J.; Dana, Jason D.
作者单位：University of London; King's College London; University of Essex; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Yale University
摘要：We examine high-stakes strategic choice using more than 40 years of data from the American TV game show The Price Is Right. In every episode, contestants play the Showcase Showdown, a sequential game of perfect information for which the optimal strategy can be found through backward induction. We find that contestants systematically deviate from the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. These departures from optimality are well explained by a modified agent quantal response model that allows for l...
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作者：Hamdan, Adam
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：A principal wants to rank and reward teams in an organization. Agents perfectly observe the local ranking of their teams, and strictly prefer being on higher-ranking teams. I show there exists an ex-post incentive compatible and efficient team ranking mechanism if (i) there is an agent who belongs to every team (supervisor condition), or (ii) whenever two teams share an agent in common, they share at least two agents in common (connectivity condition). I identify a class of organizations for w...
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作者：Comola, Margherita; Rusinowska, Agnieszka; Villeval, Marie Claire
作者单位：Universite Paris Saclay; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); emlyon business school; Universite Lyon 2; Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 1; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We experimentally investigate targeting decisions in a setting where a human player competes for influence in a network against a computerized opponent with opposing views, whose targeting choice is revealed before the player acts. By varying network structure, opponent influence, and nodes opinion heterogeneity, we find that players typically adopt best-response strategies based on relative influence. However, they sometimes deviate-for example, by erroneously targeting central nodes or by av...
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作者：Compte, Olivier
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussees
摘要：Building on the idea that lack of experience is a source of errors but that experience should reduce them, we model agents' behavior using a stochastic choice model (logit quantal response), leaving endogenous the accuracy of their choices. In some games, higher accuracy leads to unstable logitresponse dynamics. Starting from the lowest possible accuracy, we define the barrier to learning as the maximum accuracy which keeps the logit-response dynamic stable (for all lower accuracies). This def...
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作者：Garcia-Pola, Bernardo; Iriberri, Nagore
作者单位：Universidad Publica de Navarra; Universidad Publica de Navarra; University of Basque Country; Lund University
摘要：Compared with more sophisticated equilibrium theory, naive, non-equilibrium behavioral rules often better describe individuals' initial play in games. In addition, in repeated play in games, when individuals have the opportunity to learn about their opponents' past behavior, learning models of different sophistication levels are successful in explaining how individuals modify their behavior in response to the provided information. How do subjects who follow different behavioral rules in initia...
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作者：Feng, Jun; Jin, Jia; Zhao, Sasa; Derrington, Edmund; Qin, Xiangdong; Fu, Shiguang; Shen, Qiang; Dreher, Jean-Claude
作者单位：Nanjing Agricultural University; Shanghai International Studies University; South China Normal University; Universite Lyon 1; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite Lyon 1; Shanghai Jiao Tong University
摘要：Repeated strategic interactions with consistent partners involve both adaptive learning and hierarchical reasoning. Hybrid models that incorporate reasoning into adaptive learning paradigms have been proposed to capture these processes and their interactions at the behavioral level. Here, we employ model-based functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate the neural computations underlying decisions in repeated strategic interactions between two players using 11-20 money request ...
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作者：Carmona, Guilherme; Laohakunakorn, Krittanai
作者单位：University of Surrey
摘要：We consider a setting where each player of a simultaneous-move game privately designs an information structure before playing the game. One of these information structures is chosen at random to determine the distribution of the private messages that players receive. These messages allow players to correlate their actions; however, their private design implies a push from correlated to Nash equilibria. Indeed, the sequential equilibrium payoffs of the extensive-form game with privately designe...
