Transaction fee mechanisms robust to welfare-increasing collusion
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Gafni, Yotam; Yaish, Aviv
署名单位：
Weizmann Institute of Science; Yale University
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.005
发表日期：
2026
关键词：
摘要：
To allocate transactions to blocks, cryptocurrencies use auction-esque transaction fee mechanisms (TFMs). A conjecture of Roughgarden (2024) asks whether there is a TFM that is incentive compatible for both users and the miner and is also resistant to a collusion that allows them to jointly increase overall welfare. We resolve this question in the negative for deterministic TFMs, through a comprehensive characterization of designs robust to this form of collusion. For randomized TFMs, we show limits on the efficiency they can achieve.