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作者：Bland, James R.
作者单位：University of Toledo; University System of Ohio; University of Toledo
摘要：This paper develops a framework for estimating Quantal Response Equilibrium models from experimental data using Bayesian techniques. Bayesian techniques offer some advantages over the more commonly-used maximum likelihood approach: (i) more favorable small-sample properties, and (ii) ease of handling unobservable heterogeneity. As Quantal Response Equilibrium is a non-linear model, I also discuss some issues with choosing appropriate priors. Of the twenty-nine models taken to the data, the sel...
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作者：Walunj, Tushar Shankar; Singhal, Shiksha; Kavitha, Veeraruna; Nair, Jayakrishnan
作者单位：Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Bombay; Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Bombay
摘要：In this paper, we introduce a novel equilibrium concept, called the equilibrium cycle, which seeks to capture the outcome of oscillatory game dynamics. Unlike the (pure) Nash equilibrium, which defines a fixed point of mutual best responses, an equilibrium cycle is a set-valued solution concept that can be demonstrated even in games where best responses do not exist (for example, in discontinuous games). The equilibrium cycle identifies a Cartesian product set of action profiles that satisfies...
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作者：Bartholdi, Laurent; Mikhailov, Roman
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut National des Sciences Appliquees de Lyon - INSA Lyon; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 1; Ecole Centrale de Lyon; University of Geneva; Saarland University; Saint Petersburg State University
摘要：We introduce a topological invariant of games, based on homotopy theory, that measures their complexity. We examine it in the context of the Texas Hold'em variant of poker, and show that the invariant's value is at least 4. We deduce that evaluating the strength of a pair of cards in Texas Hold'em is an intricate problem, and that even the notion of who is bluffing against whom is ill-defined in some situations. The use of higher topological methods to study intransitivity of multi-player game...
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作者：Kong, Qianqian; Peters, Hans; Sun, Hao
作者单位：Nanjing University of Aeronautics & Astronautics; Maastricht University; Northwestern Polytechnical University
摘要：The quasi-prekernel is a novel solution concept for cooperative games. It is a refinement of existing prebargaining set solutions, notably the reactive, semireactive, and Aumann-Davis-Maschler prebargaining sets. It contains the prekernel, and coincides with that solution on simple games except possibly on balanced simple games with all individual worths equal to zero. An axiomatic characterization based on reduced game properties is provided. The steady version, obtained by putting conditions...
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作者：Calleja, Pedro; Llerena, Francesc
作者单位：University of Barcelona
摘要：In this paper, we explore the issue of manipulability in the setting of financial systems by considering two weak forms of immunity: merging-proofness and splitting-proofness. Not surprisingly, splitting-proofness conflicts with basic requirements such as the priority of debt over equity and the limited liability of equity. Remarkably, we provide a comprehensive characterization of the class of bankruptcy rules that gives rise to financial rules that satisfy merging-proofness.
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作者：Freer, Mikhail; Friedman, Daniel; Weidenholzer, Simon
作者单位：University of Essex; University of Barcelona; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
摘要：Why do some investors delegate financial decisions to supposed experts? We report an on-line experiment designed to disentangle four possible motives. About 800 investors drawn from the Prolific subject pool choose whether or not to delegate a real-stakes choice among lotteries to a previous investor (a designee) after seeing information on the performance of several available designees. We find that a surprisingly large fraction of investors delegate even trivial choice tasks, suggesting a ma...
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作者：Noguchi, Mitsunori
作者单位：Meijo University
摘要：This note challenges the belief that mining processes are too complex for traditional game-theoretic analysis. We provide Nash-like equilibrium solutions for two-player gap games, focusing on the strategic delay of mining rig activation in Bitcoin's Proof-of-Work (PoW) system. By delaying activation, miners can optimize profits, particularly as transaction fees become a more significant portion of their revenues (Carlsten et al., 2016). Building on the game-theoretic model of Tsabary and Eyal ...
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作者：Alvarez-Mozos, Mikel; Macho-Stadler, Ines; Perez-Castrillo, David
作者单位：University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：We introduce the family of games with intertemporal externalities, where two disjoint sets of players play sequentially. Coalitions formed by the present players create worth today, but the way these players organize also affects the future: their partition imposes externalities that influence the worth of coalitions formed by future players. We adapt the classic Shapley axioms and explore their implications. They are not sufficient to uniquely determine a value. We propose two solution concep...
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作者：Garg, Jugal; Tao, Yixin; Vegh, Laszlo A.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; University of Bonn; Corvinus University Budapest
摘要：We study the relationship between two central concepts in the allocation of divisible goods: competitive equilibrium (CE) and allocations that maximize Nash welfare, i.e., allocations where the weighted geometric mean of the utilities is maximal. When agents have homogeneous concave utility functions, these concepts coincide: the classical Eisenberg-Gale convex program that maximizes Nash welfare over feasible allocations yields a competitive equilibrium. However, they diverge for non-homogene...
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作者：Kovenock, Dan; Song, Jian; Trevisan, Francesco
作者单位：Chapman University System; Chapman University; Oklahoma City University; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia
摘要：This article examines, both theoretically and experimentally, the welfare implications of implementing symmetric bid caps in lobbying competitions. We model lobbying games as lottery contests with two radicals and one centrist, where all players strictly prefer to win. However, if they lose, radicals prefer to lose to a centrist rather than to the opposing radical. We establish the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium and find that, in the absence of a bid cap, radicals may bid aggressively...
