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作者：Cembrano, Javier; Klimm, Max; Knaack, Martin
作者单位：Universidad de Chile; Technical University of Berlin
摘要：We study a mechanism-design-without-money setting in which a designer is interested in selecting items with maximum total value under a budget constraint. The items, however, are controlled by strategic agents who aim to maximize the total value of their selected items. This setting arises naturally when agencies select projects for funding, retailers choose products to stock, or hospitals schedule MRI scans. A mechanism governing the selection is strategyproof if no agent can benefit by hidin...
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作者：Holt, Charles A.; Smith, Angela M.
作者单位：University of Virginia; James Madison University
摘要：The effect of group size and effort cost on rent dissipation in the standard Tullock rent seeking model is examined using a laboratory experiment. Data support qualitative comparative static Nash equilibrium predictions as reductions in both group size and effort cost increase effort levels. However, effort and dissipation rates are above Nash predictions for all treatments. In addition, while cutting per-unit effort costs in half increases individual effort levels, they do not fully double as...
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作者：Adler, Ilan; Bullinger, Martin; V. Vazirani, Vijay
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Bristol; University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：The equivalence between von Neumann's Minimax Theorem for zero-sum games and the LP Duality Theorem connects cornerstone problems of the two fields of game theory and optimization, respectively, and has been the subject of intense scrutiny for seven decades. Yet, as observed in this paper, the proof of the difficult direction of this equivalence is unsatisfactory: It does not assign distinct roles to the two players of the game, as is natural from the definition of a zero-sum game. In retrospe...
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作者：Cho, Hyunjun; Kim, Jin Yeub; Park, Jaeok
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Yonsei University
摘要：We examine the attainability of marginal contributions in two models of one-sided matching and assignment. For the one-sided matching problem, where agents in a single group are matched with each other, the core may be empty, and even when nonempty, some agents may fail to attain their marginal contributions in the core. By allowing fractional matchings, however, we guarantee the non-emptiness of the core and show that every agent's marginal contribution is attainable in the core. This implies...
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作者：Stringhi, Alessandro
作者单位：Prague University of Economics & Business
摘要：Guilt aversion and inequity aversion are two pivotal concepts in understanding human behavior in situations involving trust dynamics. Inequity aversion explains trustworthiness through a preference for fairness, as trustworthiness leads to more equitable distributions. Conversely, guilt aversion posits that people act to avoid the guilt associated with betraying others. As both preferences provide justifications for trustworthiness, distinguishing between them solely through observed behavior ...
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作者：Hoelzemann, Johannes; Webb, Ryan; Xie, Erhao
作者单位：University of Vienna; University of Toronto; Bank of Canada
摘要：This paper studies the falsifiability and identification of Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) when each player's utility and error distribution are relaxed to be unknown non-parametric functions. Using the variation of players' choices across a series of games, we first show that both the utility function and the distribution of errors are non-parametrically over-identified. This over-identification result further suggests a straightforward testing procedure for QRE which achieves the desired...
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作者：Ketelaars, Martijn W.; Borm, Peter; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
作者单位：Tilburg University
摘要：This article introduces the concept of duality in financial networks, which entails the division of losses versus gains. In bankruptcy problems, in which a bankrupt entity divides its non-negative assets among a group of claimants, duality is well understood. Financial networks generalize bankruptcy problems by allowing for multiple agents with individual assets interconnected by mutual claims. We argue that allowing for negative assets is imperative to adequately formulate duality for financi...
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作者：Mantovani, Marco; Filippin, Antonio
作者单位：University of Milano-Bicocca; University of Milan; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：In prediction markets, prices can be interpreted as the average belief of the traders under restrictive theoretical assumptions, i.e. specific risk preferences and the Prior Information Equilibrium. The validity of these assumptions depends on the specific market institution and on the composition of the market in terms of risk preferences. In this paper we test in a laboratory experiment the main elements that should affect the distance between prices and average beliefs, manipulating the mar...
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作者：Foo, Ki Vin; Schipper, Burkhard C.
作者单位：National University of Singapore; University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：We extend Kuhn's Theorem to games of the extensive form with unawareness. We prove that if a game of the extensive form with unawareness has perfect recall, then for each mixed strategy there is an equivalent behavior strategy. We show that the converse does not hold under unawareness without restricting the evolution of the player's awareness to constant awareness along paths of play. Both directions of Kuhn's Theorem for games of the extensive form with unawareness require a condition comple...
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作者：Lillethun, Erik
作者单位：Colgate University
摘要：In evolutionary game theory, when a population of players with the same preferences may freely choose a location in which to interact with other players, previous literature has shown that long-run evolutionary forces select in favor of payoff-dominant equilibria. In this paper, I extend this location choice aspect of evolutionary game theory to the case of two different payoff types of players in 2 & times; 2 games. I show that whether or not payoff-dominant equilibrium selection occurs depen...
