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作者：Nakamura, Kensei
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University
摘要：When aggregating Subjective Expected Utility preferences, the Pareto principle leads to an impossibility result unless the individuals have a common belief. This paper examines the source of this impossibility in more detail by considering the aggregation of a general class of incomplete preferences that can represent gradual ambiguity perceptions. Our result shows that the planner cannot avoid ignoring some individuals unless there is a probability distribution that all individuals agree is m...
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作者：Kambhampati, Ashwin
摘要：Equilibrium predictions in games of incomplete information are sensitive to the assumed information structure. Monderer and Samet (1996) and Kajii and Morris (1998) define topological notions of proximity for common prior information structures such that two information structures are close if and only if (approximate) equilibrium payoffs are close. However, Monderer and Samet (1996) fix a common prior and define their topology on profiles of partitions over a state space, whereas Kajii and Mo...
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作者：Babichenko, Yakov; Talgam-Cohen, Inbal; Xu, Haifeng; Zabarnyi, Konstantin
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Tel Aviv University; University of Chicago; Yale University
摘要：We study a variant of the principal-agent problem in which the principal does not directly observe the agent's effort outcome; rather, she gets a signal about the agent's action according to a variable information structure designed by a regulator. We consider both the case of a risk-neutral and of a risk-averse agent, focusing mainly on a setting with a limited liability assumption. We provide a clean characterization for implementability of actions and utility profiles by any information str...
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作者：Kasberger, Bernhard; Martin, Simon; Normann, Hans-Theo; Werner, Tobias
作者单位：Johannes Kepler University Linz; University of Vienna; Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf; Max Planck Society; Maynooth University; University of Southampton
摘要：Reinforcement learning algorithms play an increasingly important role in economic situations. These situations are often strategic, and the artificial intelligence may or may not be cooperative. We compare human and algorithmic cooperation rates in the infinitely repeated two-player prisoner's dilemma and study which strategies they choose to cooperate and punish deviations. Through a sequence of computational Q-learning and human-player experiments, we find that our Q-learning algorithms tend...
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作者：Gibbs, Daniel; Judd, Gleason
作者单位：Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; Princeton University
摘要：We study a policy-motivated principal choosing a representative to bargain over one-dimensional policy in a collective body under majority rule. The representative's ideology affects policy outcomes directly through their own proposal and indirectly by shaping the median's expectations, determining which proposals pass. This creates a tradeoff: a representative close to the principal's ideal point makes favorable proposals but permits extremist proposals to pass, while a more centrist represen...
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作者：Shinozaki, Hiroki
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University
摘要：We consider an object reallocation problem with transfers. We show that if a rule satisfies endowments-swapping-proofness, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and non-imposition, then the rule coincides with the top trading cycles rule without transfers (TTC without transfers). Thus, even when transfers among agents are allowed, no transfers occur under such a rule, not even in the form of fixed prices.
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作者：Dong, Wanxin; Zheng, Jiakun
作者单位：East China University of Science and Technology; Renmin University of China; Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：Prior work finds that individuals are often less prosocial when they can exploit uncertainty as an excuse. In contrast to prior work that largely explores the relevance of excuses in the gain domain, this paper investigates the relevance of excuses in both the loss and gain domains. In our laboratory experiment, participants evaluated risky payoffs for themselves and their partners in either the gain or loss domain, with or without interpersonal trade-offs. We found that participants exhibited...
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作者：Park, In-Uck; Smyrniotis, Efthymios
作者单位：University of Bristol; Economic & Social Research Institute (ESRI); Trinity College Dublin; Trinity College Dublin
摘要：We extend global games & agrave; la Carlsson and van Damme (1993) to environments where the risk-dominant equilibrium is selected even if there is no dominance solvable game in the underlying class of games. Strict dominance can emerge in the global game from strategic uncertainty due to discrete payoff changes in underlying games, and we provide sufficient conditions on payoff changes that warrant iterated dominance of the risk-dominant equilibrium. Thus, strategic uncertainty creates strictl...
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作者：Afacan, Mustafa Oguz; Dur, Umut; Gitmez, A. Arda; Yilmaz, Ozgur
作者单位：Mohamed bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence MBZUAI; North Carolina State University; Ihsan Dogramaci Bilkent University; Koc University
摘要：In school choice problems, the pursuit of student welfare (efficiency) is constrained by the requirement to respect schools' priorities (fairness). Among fair matchings, even the welfare maximizing one, the Student-Optimal Stable Matching (SOSM), is inefficient. Moreover, any mechanism that yields welfare gains over the SOSM is manipulable by students. This paper investigates the fairness and incentive properties of efficient mechanisms. We compare matchings using the notion that one matching ...
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作者：Azacis, Helmuts; Vida, Peter
作者单位：Corvinus University Budapest; CY Cergy Paris Universite; Corvinus University Budapest
摘要：A sender wants to make a public announcement to three receivers but she cannot. The Byzantine agreement communication protocol (Lamport et al., 1982) prescribes that the sender instead sends the same private message to the receivers who in turn forward to each other the message they have received from the sender. Let the receivers consider the (bitwise) majority of their received messages as a pseudo public message of the sender. We show that this protocol, besides being 1resilient, substitute...
