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作者：Martinelli, Cesar; Esandi, Naila C. Sebastian
作者单位：George Mason University; George Mason University; Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya
摘要：We propose a model of electoral accountability, and we test it in a lab setting. As predicted by the model, moral incentives and the desire for reelection interact to deter politicians from accepting bribes early in their careers. Treatments with weaker reelection incentives perform worse in encouraging good initial behavior among politicians, but are more effective in promoting good behavior later on. The probability of voter errors and politicians' intrinsic motivation for good behavior in t...
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作者：Kwon, Hyukjun; Shorrer, Ran I.
作者单位：Princeton University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We study priority-based matching markets. We propose a novel partial order for comparing matching mechanisms in terms of their fairness. Using this order, we show that efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance (EADA) is justified-envy minimal in the class of efficient mechanisms, while top trading cycles (TTC) and other popular mechanisms are not. Our findings highlight EADA as an interesting alternative to TTC in the context of transplantation-organ markets. Restricting attention to strategypro...
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作者：Chandan, Rahul; Paarporn, Keith; Kovenock, Dan; Alizadeh, Mahnoosh; Marden, Jason R.
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado at Colorado Springs; Chapman University System; Chapman University; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
摘要：Can intentionally decreasing one's own competitive abilities provide strategic benefits in adversarial environments? We investigate whether a competitor can gain an advantage by conceding valuable assets to an opponent under a well studied framework known as General Lotto games. While intuition suggests this cannot be done, we demonstrate that concessions do offer strategic benefits when made correctly. We explore concessions in two settings: 1) General Lotto games, which depict 1-vs.-1 advers...
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作者：Drouvelis, Michalis; Grosskopf, Brit
作者单位：University of Birmingham; University of Exeter
摘要：The ability to punish free-riders has been shown to sustain cooperation in social dilemma games. Those that engage in costly punishment are often those that are angry at observed contributions of their fellow group members. This paper abstracts from the effect of integral (i.e., related to the situation) emotions and explicitly studies the effect of incidental (i.e., unrelated to the situation) emotions. By inducing either positive or negative emotions we can causally investigate the effect of...
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作者：Busettoa, Francesca; Codognatoa, Giulio; Ghosalc, Sayantan; Julienb, Ludovic; Turchet, Damiano
作者单位：University of Udine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of Glasgow; University of Warwick
摘要：We consider a mixed version of the Shapley window model, where large traders are represented as atoms and small traders are represented by an atomless part. In the original spirit of Cournot (1838), we partially replicate the mixed exchange economy by increasing the number of atoms, without affecting the atomless part, and ensuring that the measure space of agents remains finite. Our main theorem shows that any sequence of Cournot-Nash allocations of the strategic market games associated with ...
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作者：Ishida, Wataru; Park, Changwoo
作者单位：Yokohama National University; Ihsan Dogramaci Bilkent University
摘要：We introduce the problem of allocating objects when society is partitioned into groups of agents, each collectively owning a number of objects equal to its size. We propose a new axiom, called within-group endowments lower bounds, which requires that each agent find his assignment at least as desirable as his least preferred object among those owned by the group to which he belongs. We identify and characterize a family of rules satisfying this axiom in addition to efficiency, group strategy-p...
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作者：Bando, Keisuke; Hirai, Toshiyuki
作者单位：Keio University; Hosei University
摘要：We consider many-to-many matching with contracts where each agent can sign multiple contracts with the same agent. In other words, the unitarity condition is not assumed in this model. We offer a weaker substitutability condition called substitutability across doctors, which is a generalization of unilateral substitutability. We show that if every hospital's choice function satisfies substitutability across doctors and every doctor's choice function is responsive, then a stable outcome exists....
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作者：Chatterji, Shurojit; Kunimoto, Takashi; Ramos, Paulo
作者单位：Singapore Management University
摘要：A social choice function (SCF) is said to be Nash implementable (in pure strategies) if there exists a mechanism in which every pure-strategy Nash equilibrium induces outcomes specified by the SCF. The main objective of this paper is to assess the impact of considering mixed-strategy equilibria in Nash implementation. We define compelling Nash implementation as a case where the implementing mechanism possesses a pure-strategy equilibrium that strictly Pareto dominates any undesired mixed-strat...
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作者：Gerasimou, Georgios
作者单位：University of Glasgow
摘要：We propose an experimental design and data-analytic method for eliciting and distinguishing the strict-preference, indifference, and indecisiveness components of individual preferences in general choice environments. The design combines a forced-choice treatment with a free-choice treatment. In both treatments, subjects may select multiple alternatives from a menu. In the free-choice treatment, subjects may also avoid or delay choice at a small expected cost. To analyze such data, we extend a ...
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作者：Demuynck, Thomas; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Seel, Christian
作者单位：Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Tilburg University; Maastricht University
摘要：We develop and extend notions of potentials for normal-form games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) to present a unified approach for the general class of social environments. The different potentials and corresponding social environments can be ordered in terms of their permissiveness. We classify different methods to construct potentials and we characterize potentials for matching problems, vote trading, multilateral trade, TU games, and various pillage games.
