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作者：Bo, Inacio; Chen, Li
作者单位：University of Macau; Tongji University; University of Gothenburg
摘要：We study the evolution of entry-level civil service job assignment in imperial China from the tenth to the early twentieth century. The procedures were sequential, irrevocable, and publicly verifiable, relying increasingly on lots-drawing and operating under constraints that limited which posts candidates could fill and where they could be posted. Using a unified matching framework, we compare procedures by their ability to maximize the number of filled posts and to assign higher-ranked jobs t...
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作者：Liu, Shuige; Maccheroni, Fabio
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：This paper aims to connect epistemic and behavioral game theory by examining the epistemic foundations of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) in static games. We focus on how much information agents possess about the probability distributions of idiosyncratic payoff shocks, in addition to the standard assumptions of rationality and common belief in rationality. When these distributions are transparent, we obtain a solution concept called Delta p-rationalizability, which includes action distribu...
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作者：Erkut, Hande; Kubler, Dorothea
作者单位：Technical University of Berlin
摘要：Repugnance constrains market design because inacceptable or repugnant transactions must be avoided. To better understand what makes a transaction repugnant, we study two potential causes: limited agency, e.g., one party being forced to accept an offer, and severe consequences of the transaction. In a laboratory experiment, we find that spectators prohibit transactions with limited agency more frequently than with full agency, especially when the consequences are severe rather than mild. The ma...
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作者：Kloosterman, Andrew; Troyan, Peter
作者单位：University of Virginia
摘要：We investigate whether preferences for objects received via a matching mechanism are influenced by how highly agents rank them in their reported rank order list. We hypothesize that all else equal, agents receive greater utility for the same object when they rank it higher. The addition of rankings-dependent utility implies that it may not be a dominant strategy to submit truthful preferences to a strategyproof mechanism, and that non-strategyproof mechanisms that give more agents objects they...
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作者：Saran, Rene
作者单位：University of Cincinnati; University System of Ohio; University of Cincinnati
摘要：We present a novel and tractable method that is widely applicable to general delegation problems. Every delegation set is equivalent to an incentive feasible mechanism. We characterize mechanisms with at most finitely many points of discontinuity and prove that the corresponding constrained problem is equivalent to a discrete-time, finite-horizon, dynamic optimization problem. This transformation makes the problem tractable: The dynamic problem is essentially a shortest-path problem that is am...
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作者：Fan, Zhongjie; He, Ping; Liu, Zehao
作者单位：University of International Business & Economics; Tsinghua University; Renmin University of China; Renmin University of China
摘要：We examine safety premiums through the lens of financial contagion in interbank networks. In our model with endogenous collateralized lending contracts, safe assets command premiums because they relax funding constraints without amplifying default propagation. Multiple equilibria characterized by distinct lending volumes and safety premiums emerge exclusively in networks containing directed cycles. The safety premium thus serves as a tractable, price-based statistic of systemic fragility. Comp...
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作者：Luo, Xiao; Qiao, Yongchuan
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Dongbei University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We propose a new dominance notion in strategic games-weak* dominance-that reflects the idea of cautious* rationality, whereby a rational player believes that each opponent's individual actions are played with positive probabilities. In this paper, we show that an action is weakly* dominated if, and only if, it is not a best response to any marginally full-support conjecture. We characterize Gul's (1996) notion of perfect z-rationalizability through an iterative procedure (S infinity W*): remov...
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作者：Acharya, Subas; Jimenez-Gomez, David; Rachinskii, Dmitrii; Rivera, Alejandro
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Morgan Stanley; University of Barcelona; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：This paper develops a dynamic wealth management model for risk-averse agents displaying present-bias in the form of hyperbolic discounting. The agent chooses optimal consumption and labor supply policies and allocates her funds between a risk-free asset, a traded liquid asset, and a non-traded illiquid asset. We characterize these policies for both sophisticated and naive present-biased agents. There are three results. First, sophisticated agents overconsume more and supply less labor than the...
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作者：Bahel, Eric; Trudeau, Christian; Wang, Haoyu
作者单位：Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; University of Windsor
摘要：We introduce the notion of preconvexity, which extends the familiar concept of convexity found in cooperative games with transferable utility. In a convex game, the larger the group joined by an agent, the larger the marginal value brought to the group by that agent. By contrast, in strictly preconvex games, an agent's marginal contribution is initially decreasing (when joining small groups), and it eventually becomes increasing at (and above) some critical group size. As a consequence, the co...
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作者：Zhou, Yihang
作者单位：Nankai University
摘要：A developer seeks to persuade a sequence of two short-tenured officials to award her a contract. Officials maximize social welfare, and the second official follows a bureaucratic norm requiring reliance only on evidence presented directly to him. Thus, Bayesian inference is restricted when the first official defers the decision, because the second does not observe the first official's evidence. The first official can exploit this restriction to induce more informative experiments. When the sta...
