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作者：Khalil, Fahad; Lawarree, Jacques; Rodivilov, Alexander
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：A principal hires an agent to learn about the cost of a project (experimentation) and then to execute it (production). The agent is privately informed about the probability that the cost is low, with the high-type agent more optimistic than the low type. Learning is modeled as a series of experiments, where the agent privately chooses his effort in each experiment. Due to the joint presence of adverse selection and moral hazard, even the low type can misrepresent his type, shirk during experim...
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作者：Friedman, Evan; Goncalves, Duarte
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; University of London; University College London
摘要：Quantal response equilibrium (QRE), a statistical generalization of Nash equilibrium, is a standard benchmark in the analysis of experimental data. Despite its influence, nonparametric characterizations and tests of QRE are unavailable beyond the case of finite games. We address this gap by completely characterizing the set of QRE in a class of binary-action games with a continuum of types. Our characterization provides sharp predictions in settings such as global games, volunteer's dilemma, a...
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作者：Dilme, Francesc
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：In a game in extensive form, we say that a sequence of trembles destabilizes an outcome if there is no corresponding sequence of payoff perturbations and Nash outcomes converging to the outcome. We use equilibrium destabilization to characterize sequential equilibria and sequentially stable outcomes, and to reinterpret standard selection criteria in signaling games as a means ruling out implausible equilibria by identifying destabilizing tremble sequences. We show that the existence of a maxim...
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作者：Berliant, Marcus; Gouveia, Miguel
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Universidade Catolica Portuguesa
摘要：The political economy setting of voting over general nonlinear income taxes with labor disincentives and information asymmetry in consumer/worker/voter types is considered. Agents do not communicate or coordinate with each other. The economy is the realization of a finite draw from a continuous distribution. The revenue required from a draw is determined by Pareto optimal provision of a public good for that draw. Assuming that the government must meet the revenue requirement for any possible d...
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作者：Innocenti, Federico
作者单位：University of Konstanz
摘要：Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016) show that competition among senders benefits receivers if and only if the information environment is Blackwell-connected. This paper shows that introducing receivers' limited attention and heterogeneous beliefs can overturn this result. Even in a Blackwell-connected information environment, information revelation may be lower under duopoly than under monopoly. Indeed, limited attention may incentivize receivers to sort into the audiences of like-minded senders. In ...
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作者：Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We study a class of social learning games in which players choose whether and when to make an irreversible investment. We ask whether the option value of learning induces delay. Surprisingly, under natural and standard assumptions, delay does not arise in equilibrium. Although waiting even momentarily would yield informative observations, we show that this learning is payoff-irrelevant. As a result, players either invest immediately or not at all. Lab rat 1: Did you get the COVID vaccine yet? ...
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作者：Macho-Stadler, Ines; Perez-Castrillo, David; Wettstein, David
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：Theorem 1 in Macho-Stadler et al. (2018) is incorrect. In this note, we correct the theorem by introducing a new axiom, the non-negative payoffs axiom, and adjusting the proof accordingly. We also discuss the implications of this correction for other results presented in the paper.
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作者：Baumann, Leonie
作者单位：McGill University
摘要：A principal must allocate a prize without monetary transfers. She wants to give it to the highest value agent. Agents know their own and their neighbors' values, as determined by a network. Competing for the prize, agents send messages about themselves (applications) and their neighbors (references). They face a limit to lying, so information is partially verifiable. No incentive-compatible mechanism achieves robust implementation. Assigning the prize as a function of best applications and wor...
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作者：Ballard, Joe S.; Boosey, Luke
作者单位：Skidmore College; State University System of Florida; Florida State University
摘要：We study dynamic coordination with costly switching, where players are initially uncertain regarding how to coordinate. We model two players searching for compatible platforms in the presence of two kinds of frictions: noisy outcomes and costly switching. The model predicts that players remain on their current platforms whenever their common belief is sufficiently optimistic; otherwise, they randomize their actions, switching with higher probability whenever they are more pessimistic about com...
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作者：Bergantinos, Gustavo; Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.
作者单位：Universidade de Vigo; Universidad Pablo de Olavide
摘要：We study the problem of measuring the popularity of artists in music streaming platforms. We uncover the space of popularity indices upon exploring the implications of several axioms capturing principles with normative appeal. As a result, we characterize several families of indices. Our characterizations might help to address the rising concern in the music industry to explore new methods that reward artists (from the revenues platforms raise by charging users) more appropriately. We actually...
