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作者：Jiao, Peiran; Nax, Heinrich H.; Zong, Jichuan
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of Zurich; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Dongbei University of Finance & Economics
摘要：Information in repeated real-world interactions is rarely fixed. Instead, over time, players typically learn more about the game structure, understand more about their own payoff correspondences, and find out what others did and earned in the past. However, how this dynamic information path influences learning and which aggregate outcomes are reached as a result have not been investigated to date. To study this, we conducted a series of laboratory experimental games where we provided more info...
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作者：Kizilkale, Can; Rodriguez, Anthony; Vohra, Rakesh V.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Pennsylvania; University of Pennsylvania
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作者：Safi, Shahir
作者单位：New Economic School
摘要：I consider environments where an upwardly-biased expert faces both costs of acquiring information and of transmitting inaccurate information relative to the realized state (forecasting error) when advising a decision-maker. While existing models study these costs separately, I show that considering them jointly can substantially alter standard results. Introducing costly information acquisition overturns the partial-communication and language-inflation predictions of models with bounded messag...
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作者：Azrieli, Yaron; Chambers, Christopher P.
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Georgetown University
摘要：We consider contests with a large set (continuum) of participants and axiomatize contest success functions that arise when performance is composed of both effort and a random element, and when winners are those whose performance exceeds a cutoff determined by the designer's budget constraint. Any such Random Performance Function (RPF) satisfies a Co-monotonicity property, which implies that opponents' effort distributions can be unambiguously ranked based on how competitive they are. We prove ...
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作者：Li, Minming; Lu, Pinyan; Sha, Xingchen; Yao, Yuhao; Zhang, Jialin
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Northwestern University; Chinese Academy of Sciences; University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, CAS; Chinese Academy of Sciences; Institute of Computing Technology, CAS
摘要：In this paper, we study the two-facility location games with optional preference where the acceptable set of facilities for each agent could be different and an agent's cost is his distance to the closest facility within his acceptable set. The objective is to minimize the total cost of all agents while achieving strategyproofness. For general metrics, we design a deterministic strategyproof mechanism for the problem with an approximation ratio of 1 + 2 alpha, where alpha is the approximation ...
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作者：Kocak, Korhan
作者单位：IE University
摘要：Parties in primary elections often choose between candidates who appeal to their base and those who appeal to the broader electorate. I present a model of primaries where incumbents can exploit this trade-off the opposition faces between ideological congruence and electability. In the model, incumbents reduce their appeal to the median voter by moving away from the center. In doing so, they provoke the opposition into nominating extremists, improving their reelection prospects. This mechanism ...
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作者：Saas, Scott
作者单位：University of Arizona
摘要：This paper explores which correlated equilibrium outcomes are robust to players having the option to publicly and verifiably disclose their private information before playing the game. I focus on outcomes that are disclosure-proof: those that can be induced such that no player is incentivized to disclose their signal. Since signals in this environment do not carry payoff-relevant information, disclosing only limits the ability to coordinate agents off-path. I show that an outcome is disclosure...
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作者：Li, Xueheng
作者单位：Sun Yat Sen University; Sun Yat Sen University
摘要：Sociologists and psychologists have long argued that emotions are essential to sustaining social norms. This study examines the role of indignation in upholding cooperation norms within society. I model indignation in a population psychological game and characterize the stochastically stable equilibrium in a noisy best-reply dynamic. The analysis yields two findings. First, indignation can sustain cooperation in the long run, irrespective of whether interactions are global or occur within a fi...
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作者：Battaglini, Marco; Palfrey, Thomas R.
作者单位：Cornell University; California Institute of Technology
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作者：Grosser, Jens; Giertz, Thorsten
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University; State University System of Florida; Florida State University; State University System of Florida; Florida State University; University of Cologne
摘要：We experimentally study pork barrel politics in repeated two-candidate majoritarian elections with costly voting. Candidates form distinct supporter groups by favoring some voters in budget spending and ignoring others. Relative to compulsory voting, voluntary voting induces on average larger, more narrowly targeted favors and therefore more inequality among otherwise identical voters. Against our prediction, candidate participants tend to cultivate policy polarization by repeatedly favoring t...
