Fair allocation in hierarchies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ju, Biung-Ghi; Jung, Soojeong; Song, Hokyu; Jo, Kyubang
• 署名单位: Seoul National University (SNU); Korea Development Institute (KDI)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.06.006
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: PERMISSION VALUE; supply chain; games; egalitarianism; adjudication; Solidarity; division; priority

摘要

Each agent in our model occupies a position in a hierarchy (a directed tree) and generates returns through collaborating with his superiors. Thus his superiors can also claim their ownership rights over his returns. Our main axiom for the allocation of these returns is the standard monotonicity with regard to the collective ownership. We establish axiomatic characterizations of monotonic allocation rules. They are represented by hierarchical transfers of the returns at each position to the superiors. When the rate of transfer is symmetric, the rules coincide with the geometric rules (ownership rates constitute a geometric sequence, moving up the hierarchy). Other fair allocation rules are also available, when the rate of transfer is asymmetric; a focal example is the hierarchical equal sharing rule, which is shown to be the unique one with an equal treatment axiom.