Group incentive-compatible allocation of discrete resources when ownership is partitioned

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ishida, Wataru; Park, Changwoo
• 署名单位: Yokohama National University; Ihsan Dogramaci Bilkent University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.003
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: RANDOM SERIAL DICTATORSHIP; STRATEGY-PROOF ALLOCATION; house allocation; Existing tenants; EQUIVALENCE; assignment; mechanisms; endowments; core

摘要

We introduce the problem of allocating objects when society is partitioned into groups of agents, each collectively owning a number of objects equal to its size. We propose a new axiom, called within-group endowments lower bounds, which requires that each agent find his assignment at least as desirable as his least preferred object among those owned by the group to which he belongs. We identify and characterize a family of rules satisfying this axiom in addition to efficiency, group strategy-proofness, and group-wise neutrality. We also consider two core notions, the standard core and the exclusion core (Balbuzanov and Kotowski, 2019). Our finding is that they are independent notions, unlike in traditional ownership structures (e.g., collective, private, and mixed ownership), and that our proposed rules always recommend allocations in their intersection.