Justified-envy-minimal efficient mechanisms for priority-based matching

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kwon, Hyukjun; Shorrer, Ran I.
• 署名单位: Princeton University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.003
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: TRADING CYCLES MECHANISM; school choice; improving efficiency; allocation; assignment; admissions; STABILITY; MARKETS; core

摘要

We study priority-based matching markets. We propose a novel partial order for comparing matching mechanisms in terms of their fairness. Using this order, we show that efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance (EADA) is justified-envy minimal in the class of efficient mechanisms, while top trading cycles (TTC) and other popular mechanisms are not. Our findings highlight EADA as an interesting alternative to TTC in the context of transplantation-organ markets. Restricting attention to strategyproof mechanisms, we show that TTC is justified-envy minimal, providing robustness to the result of Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2020).