Compellingness in Nash implementation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chatterji, Shurojit; Kunimoto, Takashi; Ramos, Paulo
• 署名单位: Singapore Management University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.008
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: RATIONALIZABLE IMPLEMENTATION; undominated strategies

摘要

A social choice function (SCF) is said to be Nash implementable (in pure strategies) if there exists a mechanism in which every pure-strategy Nash equilibrium induces outcomes specified by the SCF. The main objective of this paper is to assess the impact of considering mixed-strategy equilibria in Nash implementation. We define compelling Nash implementation as a case where the implementing mechanism possesses a pure-strategy equilibrium that strictly Pareto dominates any undesired mixed-strategy equilibrium. We show that if the finite environment and the SCF to be implemented jointly satisfy what we call Condition COM, then we can construct a finite mechanism which compellingly implements the SCF. We also identify a class of voting environments that satisfies Condition COM, extend Condition COM to accommodate social choice correspondences, and explore a preliminary stability-based justification for the implementing mechanism. Our mechanism has several desirable features: transfers are completely dispensable; only finite mechanisms are considered; integer games are not invoked; and agents' attitudes toward risk do not affect implementation.