Electoral accountability in the lab

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Martinelli, Cesar; Esandi, Naila C. Sebastian
• 署名单位: George Mason University; George Mason University; Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.008
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: POLITICAL-ECONOMY; CORRUPTION; audits

摘要

We propose a model of electoral accountability, and we test it in a lab setting. As predicted by the model, moral incentives and the desire for reelection interact to deter politicians from accepting bribes early in their careers. Treatments with weaker reelection incentives perform worse in encouraging good initial behavior among politicians, but are more effective in promoting good behavior later on. The probability of voter errors and politicians' intrinsic motivation for good behavior in the final period vary across treatments, with opportunistic behavior being more prevalent in environments with stronger electoral incentives.