Ranking teams

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hamdan, Adam
• 署名单位: Brown University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.06.004
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: SOCIAL-NETWORKS; membership; performance

摘要

A principal wants to rank and reward teams in an organization. Agents perfectly observe the local ranking of their teams, and strictly prefer being on higher-ranking teams. I show there exists an ex-post incentive compatible and efficient team ranking mechanism if (i) there is an agent who belongs to every team (supervisor condition), or (ii) whenever two teams share an agent in common, they share at least two agents in common (connectivity condition). I identify a class of organizations for which these conditions are both necessary and sufficient. In the special case where the principal wants to rank every group of co-workers in the organization, there exists a team ranking mechanism if and only if the organizational network is a star.