The case for lobbying transparency

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zerbini, Antoine
• 署名单位: Autonomous University of Barcelona
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.012
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: accountability

摘要

Lobbying transparency regulations are hailed as a potential solution to concerns about the excessive influence of special interest groups (SIGs) over policymaking. I study how these regulations shape strategic interactions between voters, politicians and SIGs. By clarifying the process through which a policy was implemented, lobbying transparency helps voters hold politicians accountable and control the influence of SIGs. Ex-post, conditional on access, SIGs prefer to operate without lobbying transparency. Ex-ante, they may benefit from lobbying transparency because it redirects the voters' blame towards politicians. However, lobbying transparency standards may ultimately hurt the electoral prospects of politicians and thus risk never being implemented, potentially explaining why voters' demand for it remains unanswered.