Competing for influence in networks through strategic targeting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Comola, Margherita; Rusinowska, Agnieszka; Villeval, Marie Claire
• 署名单位: Universite Paris Saclay; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); emlyon business school; Universite Lyon 2; Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 1; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.04.001
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: games; contagion; IDENTITY; MODEL

摘要

We experimentally investigate targeting decisions in a setting where a human player competes for influence in a network against a computerized opponent with opposing views, whose targeting choice is revealed before the player acts. By varying network structure, opponent influence, and nodes opinion heterogeneity, we find that players typically adopt best-response strategies based on relative influence. However, they sometimes deviate-for example, by erroneously targeting central nodes or by avoiding the opponent's target. Targeting is also affected by affinity and opposition biases, the strength of which depends on the initial opinion distribution. Targeting the center, avoiding the competitor's target, or selecting nodes based on their initial opinions when these are not best responses generates significant efficiency losses.