On the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium under the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cheng, Yao; Wang, Dazhong; Yu, Jingsheng
• 署名单位: Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China; Nanjing University; Wuhan University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.04.006
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: School choice; STABILITY; games

摘要

This paper studies a preference revelation game induced by the Efficiency-Adjusted Deferred Acceptance (EDA) mechanism in a priority-based allocation problem. The main findings are: (i) we show the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium under EDA through a simple algorithm; (ii) the equilibrium outcome from the algorithm coincides with the outcome of the Top Trading Cycles mechanism; and (iii) the strategy profile found by the algorithm is also a strictly strong Nash equilibrium in the game induced by the Deferred Acceptance mechanism.