Information manipulation of wishful thinkers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Filiz-Ozbay, Emel; Liu, Zhenxun
• 署名单位: University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Jinan University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.010
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: rational inattention; MODEL; preference; disclosure

摘要

Digital platforms may manipulate customer reviews to impede other consumers from acquiring accurate information and to increase sales. In a rational inattention setting where consumers acquire information about product quality before making purchasing decisions, we show that the platform has incentives to restrict information acquisition in the presence of consumers with wishful thinking. These biased consumers are unaware of their bias and weigh any good news about the product quality more heavily than a Bayesian consumer. We identify the conditions under which the firm optimally constrains information acquisition, and characterize when competition can alleviate this type of exploitation. Our results extend to a broader class of non-Bayesian rules beyond wishful thinking.