Single-crossing dominance: A preference lattice

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Curello, Gregorio; Sinander, Ludvig
• 署名单位: University of Mannheim; University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.004
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: expected utility; ambiguity; MONOTONICITY; definition; families; aversion; RISK

摘要

Most comparisons of preferences are instances of single-crossing dominance. We examine the lattice structure of single-crossing dominance, proving characterisation, existence and uniqueness results for minimum upper bounds of arbitrary sets of preferences. We apply these theorems to derive new comparative statics theorems for collective choice and under analyst uncertainty, and to characterise a general 'maxmin' class of uncertainty-averse preferences over Savage acts.