The evolution of strategies in repeated 2 × 2 anti-coordination games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wu, Jiabin
• 署名单位: University of Oregon
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.002
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: cooperation; RECIPROCITY; DYNAMICS; complexity; STABILITY; emergence; extortion; selection; penguins; logic

摘要

This paper examines the evolution of strategies in repeated 2 x 2 anti-coordination games. Turn-taking is advantageous against strategies that consistently choose the same stage-game action, provided the discount factor is sufficiently high or the payoff asymmetry in coordination is sufficiently low. However, it becomes vulnerable when the set of strategies allowed to invade is expanded. Nonetheless, if the matching process exhibits a high degree of assortativity, turn-taking regains robustness as long as it promotes efficiency.