Conventions in large games with randomly drawn payoffs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Newton, Jonathan; Sawa, Ryoji
• 署名单位: Kyoto University; University of Tsukuba
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.12.006
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: strategy nash equilibria; best-response dynamics; stochastic stability; RANDOM-PATHS; innovation diffusion; EVOLUTION; speed; number; CONVERGENCE; selection

摘要

By showing that a one-shot deviation property holds for almost all large games with i.i.d. randomly drawn payoffs in which a convention (in the sense of Young, 1993a) exists, long-run outcomes under behavioral rules are characterized by social choice rules.