Mixed signals: Charity reporting when donations signal generosity and income

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bracha, Anat; Vesterlund, Lise
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Boston; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.001
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 24-42
• 关键词: Signaling in a multi-dimensional type space; Charitable donations; status; Donation visibility

摘要

False inference may be drawn in asymmetric information environments where the type space is multi-dimensional and the analysis is restricted to only one of those dimensions. We demonstrate this by studying donation-visibility in a charitable-giving environment. Past studies show that donation-visibility increases giving and argue that this is consistent with donations signaling generosity or income and thereby improving donors' status. However, this explanation relies on status being one-dimensional, acquired from only one attribute: generosity or income. The response may differ when instead status is multidimensional, depending on both attributes. Donors who prefer to be perceived as poor and-generous rather than rich-and-stingy may give less when donations are visible. Using an experiment we examine the effect of donation-visibility when donations can signal multiple attributes. Revealing concerns for both income-and generosity-status, we find, in contrast to the one-attribute setting, that donation-visibility does not increase giving when donations signal both attributes. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.