Bidding rings: A bargaining approach

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chatterjee, Kalyan; Mitra, Manipushpak; Mukherjee, Conan
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata; Lund University; Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Bombay
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.007
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 67-82
• 关键词: Bidding rings; Bargaining games; coalition formation; auctions

摘要

We address the issue of bidder ring formation in single and multi-unit Vickrey auctions. We analyze this issue in a bargaining game set up under the assumption that valuation of bidders is commonly known only amongst themselves. In the single unit case, we show that the equilibrium coalition structure can only be an order preserving r-ring, that includes the winner and the top (r - 1) losers. In the multiple units case, we specify sufficient conditions for formation of an interesting class of equilibrium coalition structures, which we call single winner ring with free riding, where exactly one winner colludes with all the losers and generates maximum possible bidders' surplus, and, depending on the protocol, the remaining winners free ride either by staying alone or by colluding in pairs. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.