Price-setting and attainment of equilibrium: Posted offers versus an administered price

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Collins, Sean M.; James, Duncan; Servatka, Mara; Woods, Daniel
• 署名单位: Fordham University; Fordham University; Macquarie University; Purdue University System; Purdue University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.012
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 277-293
• 关键词: Market entry game; Posted offer market; Advance production; Isomorphism; equilibration

摘要

The operation of the posted offer market with advance production environment (Mestelman and Welland, 1988), appropriately parameterized, differs from that of the market entry game (Selten and Guth, 1982), appropriately presented, only in terms of price-setting. We establish the effect of this difference in price-setting on attainment of the competitive equilibrium allocation while controlling for effects relating to the presentation of the market entry game and to the stationarity or non-stationarity of environment. Free posting of prices promotes convergence to the competitive equilibrium allocation, while the typical market entry game data can be characterized as displaying cycling prices. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.